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ABSTRACT
PRICING POLICIES IN THE LINEN SUPPLY INDUSTRY
by
Kevin Kearns Steiner
Submitted to the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management on
May 11, 1979 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the Degree of Master of Science.
Linen supplies use a number of different types of pricing
systems. Some of these systems charge customers a single price
for each piece of linen soiled. Other systems charge cus-
tomers in two parts: Customers pay a price per piece of linen
soiled, and also a price for the right to rent linen at those
piece rate prices.
As long as a linen supply has some degree of monopoly
power, it can earn larger profits by using a two-part pric-
ing system rather than charging a single price for the linen
it provides. What form of two part pricing system is best
for a linen supply to use depends on the market in which the
linen supply operates. For markets which include a sizeable
segment of large, very price sensitive customers, it will
be best for the linen supply to charge customers a right to
rent linen price in the form of a delivery fee which is the
same for all customers. For markets in which large customers
are not more price sensitive than smaller customers, a linen
supply should charge a right to rent linen price in the form
of an inventory fee. This inventory fee is charged for
each piece of linen the linen supply holds to service each
customer and hence, larger customers will be charged larger
right to rent linen prices.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert S. Pindyck,
Associate Professor of
Applied Economies
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CHAPTER I
THE LINEN SUPPLY INDUSTRY
A. What is a Linen Supply?
A linen supply provides customers with a variety of clean
linen by way of a regular system of pick up and delivery. A
linen supply, unlike a laundry, owns most of the linens it
washes and in effect leases these linens to its customers.
Deliveries are made as frequently as once a day and as infre-
quently as once a month. Typically, the linen supply plant
operates on a five day cycle. Each day, each delivery driver
runs a different part of his route; that is, each day of the
week the driver delivers clean and picks up dirty linen from a
different string of customers. The dirty linen picked up by
the -driver on the first day of the cycle is counted and sorted
by workers inside the linen plant on the second day of the cycle.
On the third day the linen is washed and dried in huge machines
made expressly for industrial laundries. On the fourth day,
the linen is pressed, folded and bundled into packages desig-
nated for particular customers. Again,' large specialized
equipment is normally used to process the linen. On the final
day of the cycle the oackaged linen is separated by route and
stacked in huge baskets, which the delivery men wheel to
their trucks for loading. Thus, on the next morning, the
cycle is ready to begin again.
There are over four hundred types of linens which a linen
supply might offer its customers, although typically a full-
servicm linen supply will provide only seventy-five to a hundred
,different types and colors of linen. Exactly what products
are offered varies, of course, among linen supplies, but the
following table does provide a general picture of the product
lines carried by a linen supply plant.
General
Product
Type
Uniforms
# of
Products
10
Flat towels 10
Bed linens
Table cloths
Napkins
Aprons
Mops
Entryway
Latex Mats
Continuous towels
Oven mitts
Patient gowns
Paper towels
Toilet paper
Colors
Avai l-
able
5
1
1
4
3
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
Typical
Customers
Heavy industrial
companies; restaurants;
automobile-related
companies
Restaurants; doctors'
offices; gyms; country
clubs; garages; bars
Motels; hotels
Restaurants
Restaurants
Restaurants; bakeries;
butcher shops; print
shops
Various
Various
Public restrooms in
restaurants, bars, gyms,
offices
Restaurants
Doctors' offices
Various
Various
The percent of total revenues associated with each
general product type varies so widely among linen supplies as
to make it impossible to associate a typical percent of total
revexue figure with each general product type. Nevertheless,
we may observe that for nearly all linen supplies, uniform
rentals are a major source of revenue. In fact, some linen
supplies specialize in providing uniform service. For many,
continuous towels are a very important product, and yet some
linen supplies do not carry continuous towels at all. For a
few, bed linens are a major revenue producer, although many
linen supplies have tried to keep their volume of bed linens
relatively low due to the rather high shrinkage associated with
these, items.
.A linen supply's costs, other than capital costs, are of
four basic types: processing costs, which are'those costs
directly associated with washing, pressing or dry cleaning
linens; inventory costs, or the costs of maintaining an inventory
of linen sufficient to meet customer:needs; delivery costs, which
are those costs associated with maintaining the linen company's
fleet of trucks and staffing them with delivery drivers; and
finally, general and administrative costs. Although there is
considerable variation among linen supplies, the following dis-
tr.bution of these costs would be fairly common in the industry:
Type of Cost % of Total Cost
Production 25%
Textile 30%
Delivery 15%
General & Administrative 30%
The key person in a linen supply plant is the plant manager.
It is his job to coordinate the sales force, delivery department
and production department. It is his responsibility to set
up prices for each of the linen supply's products, although in
practice he may share this responsibility with his sales
manager and delivery department manager.
Most plant managers are college educated, although very
few hold advanced degrees in business or economics. Typically,
the plant manager has worked for a linen supply for a number
of years and has spent time in both the the production depart-
ment and in the delivery department. He is generally well-
acquainted with the market conditions in the area served
by his plant, and in fact may have considerable knowledge
about which of his customers are sensitive to the price of
the products his plant provides and which ar'e more concerned
with a product's quality and appearance.
B. Industry Structure
Large companies in the linen supply industry generally
consist of chains of linen supplies spread over wide geographical
areas with plants in many smaller cities as well as in large
metropolitan areas. The five largest such linen supply
companies in the United States are:
1. National Service Industries. This company owns
approximately 40 linen supply plants in the United
States. It is publicly traded and has an approximate
9(1979) market value of $203,000,000.
2. Steiner Corporation. Steiner owns thirty linen
supplies in the United States and an additional
thirty plants outside the United States, making it
the largest company in the industry world-wide.
It is privately held.
3. American Linen Supply Co.. This company operates
twenty-seven plants in the United States. It also
is privately held.
4. F. W. Means. Means owns 28 plants in the United
States. It is publicly traded and has an approximate
market value of $28,000,000.
5. Workwear. This company owns 19 plants in the
United States. It is publicly traded and has an
approximate market value of $17,500,000.
It would be a mistake to think that any of these large
linen supply companies have, on the level of the firm as a
whole, any monopoly power. The market for linen supply services
is essentially local. Thus, particular plants belonging to these
large linen supply companies may have some monopoly power,
while others may operate in very competitive markets.
Nearly all cities in the United States are serviced by
at least one linen supply. Large cities such as New York or
Chicago may be serviced by as many as fifteen or twenty large
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linen supplies and a good number of smaller ones. In some
cases, plants located as far as seventy-five miles away, will
send a delivery driver into such metropolitan centers. Competi-
tion in the big cities is generally rather fierce, and hence
managers are left with little discretion as to where to set
prices. In general, no one linen supply is able to secure
more than a fairly small market share.
In smaller cities competition among linen supplies is
much less severe. This is particularly true in small western
cities such as Casper, Wyoming (population: 40,000) or Grand
Junction, Colorado (population: 25,000) which are so isolated
from other cities as to prevent linen supplies located else-
where from invading the local market. In such cities, there
is unlikely to be more than three linen supplies, and hence
a large linen supply would enjoy a near monopoly position.
In Casper, Wyoming, for example, one linen supply plant
controls 60% of the market for linen supply services, with the
remaining 40% divided among two or three smaller linen supplies.
The monopoly positions of these small city linen supplies
are protected by three fairly formidable barriers to entry:
1. There is a lot to know in order to run a linen
supply. There are more and less efficient ways to
lay out a plant and to organize 0a sales force and
delivery department. Certain mixes of soap, starch
and hot water are much harder on textiles than others.
11
Finally, certain laundry equipment is more
efficient than cthers, and in fact some of a
large linen supply's equipment must be specially
designed and built to order.
2. Building a large linen supply requires a consid-
erable amount of capital--$1,000,000 at least.
3. One could start up a small linen supply for con-
siderably less than a million dollars, of course,
but there are significant economies of scale
associated with a large linen supply plant. The
large industrial type machines are much more effi-
cient than smaller washers and dryers. More import-
antly, many of a linen supply's customers demand
a large variety of products. Without special equip-
ment and a large investment in textiles, a smaller
linen supply cannot process'the variety of products
required by these customers and hence, cannot effi-
ciently compete for the business of these customers.
C. Industry Pricing Policies
There are four pricing systems which have been used in
linen supplies. Very commonly, one linen supply may use more
than one pricing system. Most linen supplies, for example,
do not use the same pricing system for uniform rentals as
they use for flat goods--towels, bed linens, tablecloths,
etc. Many linen supplies, in fact, use different pricing
systems for the same type of product, depending on the size
and type of customer. For all types of linen supply products,
volume discounts are common, which for very large customers
may be as high as 20% off list prices. The four most
commonly used pricing systems are as follows:
1. Piece-Rate System. Plants using this pricing system
charge customers a fee for each item of linen soiled by the
customer. The fee varies according to the type of linen used.
Thus, for example, a restaurant which used 100 napkins and
25 tablecloths during a particular billing period would be-
charged as follows:
Quantity Product Piece Rate Price Total
100 Napkins (white, @ $.08 = $8.00
regular)
25 Tablecloths @ .43 10.75
(white, 64 x 64)
Amount Billed: $18.75
The piece-rate system was formerly the standard pricing system
in the industry. However, in the late 50's as managers became
more concerned with increased costs in the industry, they
determined that there was a critical customer size: For
customers generating revenues less than this critical size
of customer, the costs of billing, keeping records'and delivering
to that customer exceeded the revenue brought in by that customer.
13
It was simply not profitable to rent two aprons a month @ 35¢
each to a hamburger stand or a Mom-and-Pop grocery store.
Hence, plant managers began to change from the piece rate
system to the pricing systems discussed below.
2. Piece-Rate with a Minimum. The simplest solution to the
problem of critical customer size was to augment the piece rate
system with a minimum charge for small customers. Under this
system, customers are billed the greater of a minimum monthly
charge, which is the same for all customers, or what the cus-
tomer would be charged under a pure Piece-Rate system. For
example, a linen supply may charge 25¢ for each Turkish towel
and 16¢ for each massage towel soiled by the customer. Should
the linen supply have a minimum charge of $8 per month and
should a particular customer soil only 20 Turkish towels and
10 massage towels, the customer would be charged the $8 mini-
mum rather than the $6.60 he would pay on a pure Piece-Rate
basis.
Quantity Product Piece-Rate Price Total
20 Turkish @ $.25 = $5.00
10 Massage @ .16 = 1.60
$6.60
Minimum $8.00
Amount Billed $ 8.00
14
The Piece-Rate with a Minimum system is very common in
linen supplies. Typically, the minimum monthly charge is
set by the plant manager at what he believes to be the critical
size of customer revenue for his plant. That is, the minimum
monthly charge is set at that point for which the revenue which
would be obtained from a certain size of customer is just equal
1
to the cost of providing linen service to that customer.
3. Flat Rate. The Flat Rate system is another simple solution
to the problem of critical customer size. Under this system,
the customer is charged the same fixed amount each billing
period. This amount is based on the volume of linen the
customer is expected to use rather than the volume of linen
he actually does use each period. If a potential customer is
not expected to generate revenues of the critical size, his
business is simply not accepted.
Suppose, for example, that a bakery contracts with a linen
supply to provide it with 10 white aprons per week and agrees
to be billed on a flat-rate basis. The bakery might during
one month soil 40 aprons and be billed $14 for that month.
The following month, due to vacations or illness, the bakery
may use only 35 aprons. Nonetheless, its linen bill for the
month would again be $14.-
The flat rate system is very common among linen supplies,
largely because it greatly simplifies bookkeeping and profit
planning for the linen supply. Also, as linen suppliers
15
are quick to point out, it assures customers that their linen
bills will be exactly as budgeted.
4. Inventor• Charge Plus Laundering Fee
Some linen supplies charge customers according to the
amount of linen inventory that the linen supply must purchase
and maintain in order to service that customer. This inventory
charge is augmented by a relatively small laundering fee which
the linen supply charges customers to pick up soiled linen,
process it and return the linen clean to the customer. Thus,
the linen supply, in effect, rents to the customer an inventory
of linen and charges the customer for maintaining that linen
in a clean and usable state.
There are standard rules of thumb in the industry to deter-
-mine the quantity of linen that should be held to service a
particular customer. Basically, these rules relate the
appropriate level of inventory to hold to the quantity of
linen the customer soils per month, since, obviously, the
greater the quantity of linen a customer soils, the larger
will be the inventory it is appropriate to hold for that cus-
tomer.
To see how the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee
pricing system works, let-us consider as an example an auto-
motive repair shop employing ten mechanics each of whom normally
uses three coveralls per week. The repair shop receives its
delivery every week and thus, for every coverall soiled by the
customer per week the linen supply believes it must maintain
an inventory of three coveralls. The monthly inventory charge
for this customer might be calculated as follows.
Weekly
# of Coveralls Inventory Weekly
Expected Soiled x Inventory x Charge per = Inventory
Per Week Multiple Coverall Charge
30 3 $.39 $35.10
Weekly Inventory Monthly Inventory
Charge Charge
4 x $35.10 = $140.40
Suppose that each week during the month the automotive repair shop
soiled only 28 coveralls. Then the repair shop would have soiled
112 coveralls during the month, and would be charged a laundering
fee as follows:
# of Coveralls
Soiled
112
Laundering Fee
x Per Coverall
$1.10
= Laundering Fee
$123.20
The total amount billed the repair shop would then be:
Inventory
Charge
$140.40
Laundering
+ Fee
$123.20
Amount Billed
$263.60
The Inventory Charge plus Laundering Fee pricing system
is relatively new to the linen supply industry. It was intro-
duced in Portland, Oregon in the 1960's. At present, the system
has gained relatively little acceptance. Those plants which do
use it, normally employ it only for large uniform accounts,
seasonal flat linen accounts or accounts which require the linen
17
supply to purchase linen it would not ordinarily buy.
D. Cost-Plus Pricing
Whichever pricing system is used, the linen supply plant
manager must at some point choose a particular price to charge
for each type of linen his plant provides. In very competitive
markets, the price is largely determined for the plant manager
by prevailing market conditions: The manager can only charge
as much as his competitors do. In less competitive markets,
however, managers have considerable discretion in setting
prices and it is important to understand how this decision is
typically made in the linen supply industry.
When a plant manager does have discretion in setting
prices, by far the most common way for a manager to select a
particular level of prices is for the manager to choose- some
target rate of return and to set prices so as to achieve some
target rate of return. The type of rate of return used may
be return on inventory investment, return on the book value
of average total assets, or return on the book value of average
equity. The target rate of return selected, of course, depends
on particular market conditions.
An industry journal provides the following example of how
to set piece-rate prices to achieve a target return on inventory
investment: 2
If you find from cost accounting that an
item costs approximately 17 cents, for example (i.e.,
full cost-production, distribution and administrative
costs included), and you estimate that you get an
average of 17 servings per year and the net purchase
cost of the item is a dollar then--
o Yearly return required is 30% x $1.00 = 30¢
30
o Profit needed per serving is = 1.8¢17 servings
o Price that should be
charged to vield a 30%
return on textile invest-
ment is 17¢ (your cost)
+ 1.8¢ (profit reauired
per serving) = .19
(rounded
off)
This may not be the price you wish to
charge because of your market but this
information can be extremely valuable.
The important fact to notice about rate of return methods
for setting prices, is that higher rates of return do not neces-
sarily mean higher profits for the linen supply. A linen supply
earning a relatively high rate of return may do a smaller volume
of business than it would if its target rate of return were
lower and hence earn smaller total profit than it would at a
lower rate of return. Consider for example two linen supplies,
A and B, which operate in the same market and have identical
costs. Both A and B carry Turkish towels which, as in the
example above, cost an average 17¢ to process and $1.00 to
purchase. Each linen supply expects to get 17 servings per
year, or in other words, expects to process the towel 17 times
before it wears out, is stolen or lost.
Plant A has a target return of 30% per year and hence
charges 19 cents per towel on a piece-rate basis. (Calculations
are identical to those in the example.) At 19 cents per towel,
the linen supply does a volume of 22,000 Turkish towels over the
year and earns a profit of $400 during the year.
Volume Price Total Revenue
20,000 x 194 = $3,800
Volume
20,000
Average Cost
17¢ =
Total Cost
$3,400
$3,800
3.400
Profit: $ 400
Plant B has a target return of 15% per year. The price
it charges is calculated as follows:
o Yearly return required is 15% x $1.00 = .15¢
o Profit needed per serving is .15 = .09
17 servings
o Price that should be charged
to yield a 15% return on inventory
investment is .17 + .09 = $.18, rounded
off
At 18 cents per towel, Plant B is able to steal quite a few
customers from Plant A and hence does a volume of 50,000
Turkish towels during the year. It earns a profit of $500, as
opposed to Plant A's profit of $400.
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Volume Price Total Revenue
50,000 x 18¢ = $9,000
Volume Average Cost = $8,500
50,000 x 17¢ = $8,500
$9,000
-,.8,000
$ 500
The rate of return methods of setting price are, of course,
versions of cost-plus pricing: The linen supply charges so as to
insure a profit margin--expressed as a percentage rate of return
--over its total costs of providing linen service. As we have
just seen, these cost-plus pricing methods need not lead a linen
supply to maximize profits. Why then, it is reasonable to ask, are
rate of return methods for setting prices so common in the
industry?
The answer, it seems to me, is that cost-plus pricing is
very easy to-use. The linen supply manager, after all, must
set prices for each of the seventy-five'to a hundred different
types and colors of products his plant provides, as well as
attend to the hundreds of other aspects of running the linen
supply. Any methods dc setting prices which require market
surveys and detailed data analysis, however theoretically
acceptable.those methods may be, are entirely useless to the
plant manager. He simply does not have the time, nor the
resources to use them. Unless some more sophisticated method
for setting price levels can be made easy and quick to use,
the linen supply manager is better off using his cost-plus
pricing tempered by his judgement of what the market will
bear.
We shall return to this theme in Chapter V where I shall
present what I believe to be a workable and sophisticated
method for setting prices at the appropriate levels. In
Chapter II and Chapter III, however, I shall take up the topic
of which sort of pricing system--Piece Rate, Piece-Rate with a
Minimum, Flat-Rate, or Inventory Plus Laundering Fee--is best
for linen supplies to use.
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CHAPTER ONE
FOOTNOTES
lIt has been my experience that "the cost of providing
linen service" is intended by most i.anagers to mean the
average total cost rather than the marginal cost.
Laurason, Jim. "How to Calculate and Use Return on
Textile Investment," Linen Supply News, November 1976, p. 40.
CHAPTER II
ONE PART PRICING SYSTEMS
In this chapter, I shall begin to present economic
analyses of the various pricing systems used by linen supplies.
Specifically, this chapter has four sections. In Section (A)
I shall introduce several important economic concepts and
in Section (B), use those concepts to define the maximum
profit that can be earned in the short run1 by a given firm
operating in a given market. As we shall see, these maximum
profits may be obtained under a discriminating one-part
pricing system. In Section (C), I shall examine how profits
may be maximized under a non-discriminating one-part pricing
system and finally in Section (D), I shall discuss to what
.extent the Piece Rate pricing system may be explained in terms
of a non-discriminating one-part pricing system.
A. Economic Concepts
Generally speaking, there are just two elements which
determine the maximum short term profit that can be earned
by a firm: what customers are willing to pay for the firmIs
output and what it costs the firm to produce that output.
What customers are willing to pay for a firm's output
varies, of course, from firm to firm depending on what the
firm is selling, the tastes of its customers, the incomes of
those customers, the availability of substitutes for
23
24
the firm's output and a myriad of other factors. Nonetheless,
for particular firms operating at a specific time in a particu-
lar market, there is a unique relationship between the price
the firm charges for its output and the amount of output the
firm can sell. This relationship between price and the amount
of output a firm can sell is called the firm's demand curve.
More formally, a demand curve is the relation between the
price charged per-unit of output P and the total quantity
produced Q, such that the pair (Pi,Qi) is on a firm's demand
curve if and only if the maximum price the firm can charge
thfor its Q , or last, unit of output is P..i I
Demand curves may have various shapes. In a purely
competitive market, the demand curve faced'by a-particular
firm will be a flat, horizontal line. This shape reflects
the fact that at prices above the going market price, the firm
will sell no output. In a monopolistic market, the demand
curve faced by the monopolostic firm will have a negative
slope; that is, the demand curve will slope downward to the
right. This shape of demand curve reflects the fact that
the amount of output the monopolistic firm can sell will vary
depending on the price it charges for its output: at high
prices the firm's customers will purchase fewer units of
output than they would purchase at low prices. In a very
few markets, the demand curve faced by a firm may have a
portion which is positively sloped reflecting the fact
25
that for a certain range of prices customers value the
firm's output more highly the higher the price is.
For a given firm, the total cost that firm incurs
depends only on the level of output the firm produces.
Normally, the greater the output the firm produces the higher
will be its total costs. For some firms, as volume increases
total costs will increase at a constant rate. For other
firms, as volume increases total costs will increase at
varying rates. Put another way, for some firms the cost of
producing an additional unit of output remains the same as the
level of total output increases, while for other firms, the
cost of producing an additional unit of output varies as
the level of output increases. The cost of an additional unit
of output, or equivalently, the rate of change of a firm's
total costs, is called the marginal cost of production.
There is an interesting interpretation of a firm's
marginal cost function. Since any firm will produce its
Qth unit of output only if the price it can receive for
that unit of output is greater than or at least equal to its
cost of producing that unit, the minimum price which the firm
must receive for it to produce its Qth unit of output is the
marginal cost of producing the Qth unit. Thus, for example,
a firm will produce its 100 unit of output only if the
price it will receive for that 10 0th unit is greater than
or equal to the firm's cost of producing the 100th unit--
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i.e., the marginal cost function of the firms evaluated at
th-the 100 unit.
Thus, it is apparent that a firm's marginal cost function
places a lower bound on the price at which the firm would be
willing to sell each additional unit. More specifically, if
Pi is the price charged per-unit, and the total quantity pro-
duced is Qi, then if the pair (Pi,Qi) is on a firm's marginal
cost curve, then the firm will be willing to produce the
Q. b unit of output only if the price it receives for
that unit is greater than or equal to Pi.
B. The Maximum Profit Achievable by a Given Firm Operating
in a Given Market
We have now identified two important ways in which price
and the quantity of output a firm produces are related. The
demand curve facing a firm gives, for each level of output
the firm might produce, the maximum price per unit of output
at which the firm could sell all of its output. A firm's
marginal cost function gives, for each level of output the
firm might produce, the cost of producing one additional unit
of output.
With this background, the rule for a given firm to maxi-
mize profits by operating-in a given market is very simple:
27
Rule For Maximizing Profit Under a Discriminating One-Part
Pricing System
First, charge each customer the maximum amount he is
willing to pay for each unit of output he purchases.
Second, continue to produce and sell output until the
marginal cost of production, i.e., the cost of producing
one additional unit of output, is equal to the maximum
price that customers are willing to pay for that unit
of output.
This rule defines a discriminating, one-part pricing
system. The system is discriminating because it charges
different customers different prices for each unit of output
they purchase, and hence the system discriminates among
customers. The system is a one-part pricing system, because,
although the price charged for different units of outputmay
vary, each customer is charged a single price for each unit
he purchases.
To see how this rule works, we shall consider an example.
Let us suppose that a certain firm has a monopoly in.:a given
market and hence is faced with a downward sloping'demand curve.
Also, we shall suppose that the firm's total costs increase
at varying rates as volume increases and hence, the firm will
have a varying marginal cost curve.
Demand and marginal cost functions satisfying these
28
descriptions are depicted on the following graph.
Pq
MCq
Q* Output
Demand and M"arqinal Cost Curves for the Firm
If the firm charges each customer the maximum amount he
is willing to pay for each unit of output, then the firm will
not charge all customers the same price nor even the same
customers the same price for different units of output.
Rather, the firm will negotiate the price for each unit of
output purchased by each customer. Thus, customers who are
willing to pay a large amount for a unit of output will be
charged a large amount. Other customers, who are very nearly
satiated with the firm's output, would be charged much less
rginal Cost
Curve
mand Curve
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for additional units of output.
More specifically, we might think of the firm as producing
its first unit of output and selling that unit in the market
for the highest price any customer would be willing to pay for
it. What that price would be is determined by finding that
point on the demand curve where the quantity sold is one unit
and observing the maximum price the firm can charge to sell
that one unit. The firm then brings its second unit of output
to the market and sells that unit for the highest price any
customer is willing to pay. What that price would be is again
determined from the demand curve: the firm locates that point
on the demand curve where the quantity sold is two-units and
charges for the second unit of output the maximum price at
which it can sell the second unit. The firm continues this
process for the third, fourth and following units of output.
In effect, by charging each customer the maximum amount
he is willing to pay for each unit of output, the firm lowers
the price it charges for each subsequent unit of output. Fur-
thermore, since the firm's demand curve given for each quantity
of output the maximum price the firm can charge to sell its
last unit of output, the optimal price to charge for each
unit of output is determined from the demand curve facing the
firm.
If the firm continues to produce and sell units until the
cost of producing an additional unit is equal to the maximum
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price that some customer would be willing to pay for that unit
of output, then the firm will produce and sell exactly Q units
of output. The marginal cost of producing the Q*th unit of
output is equal to the amount the firm would earn by selling
that unit in the market. Should the firm produce more than
Q* units, the cost of producing those extra units will exceed
the amount that the firm can receive by selling those units
and hence the firm would lose money. Should the firm produce
less than Q* units, the price some customer is willing to pay
for an additional unit is greater than what it would cost
the firm to produce that unit. Hence the firm could increase
its profit by producing and selling additional units. In
fact, .only by producing and selling Q* units, will the firm
achieve maximum profit.
The profit earned by the firm on each unit it sells is
equal to the difference between the price it can charge for
that unit and the cost of producing that unit. In terms of
the above graph, the profit the firm;earns on its qth unit of
.output is represented by the distance between the demand curve
evaluated at q. and the marginal cost curve evaluated at q.
The total profit earned by the firm is equal to the sum of
the profits it earns on each unit it sells. Thus, the total
profit earned by the firm is equal to the entire area
between the demand curve facing the firm and its marginal cost
curve. This is the area shaded in the above graph.
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This profit is the maximum profit that the firm could
earn by selling its output in the market. As is apparent
from studying the graph, there is no way to increase the
firm's profits without either shifting the demand curve
outward--thereby defining a different market for the firm's
products, or shifting the marginal cost curve inward--suppos-
ing thereby, that a different firm with different costs now
produces for the market. Thus, a discriminating, one-part
pricing system achieves the maximum profits possible for a
given firm operating in a given market.
Despite the profitability of the system, there are
two important reasons why a firm might choose not to use a
discriminating one-part pricing system;
First, for a firm, such as a linen supply, which deals
with a large number of customers, many of whom demand large
quantities of output, it would be entirely impractical to
negotiate with each customer the maximum price he is willing
to pay for each unit of output. The transactions cost of per-
forming such negotiations far outweigh the benefits which
the firm can ecpect to receive from price discrimination.
Second, price discrimination among customers, which
is unjustified by differences in costs incurred to sell to
different customers, is illegal. Price discrimination is
explicitly forbidden by Section 1 (a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act (15 U.S.C. Sections 13 and 13a):
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either
directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where
such cormmodities ae sold for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States or any Territory thereof
or the District of Columbia or any insular possession
or other place under the jurisdiction of the United
States, and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them:
Provided, that nothing herein contained shall prevent
differentials which make only due allowance for differences
in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting
from the differing methods or quantities in which such
commodities are to such purchasers sold ot delivered.
Because of these reasons a firm is likely not to wish to
discriminate in price among its customers. Nevertheless, the
discriminating one-part pricing system will continue to interest
us in the following analyses as a benchmark from which to
judge the effectiveness of other pricing systems.
C. Maximizing Profit Under a Non-Discriminating One-Part
Pricing System
In this section, I shall discuss how the optimal pricing
strategy of a firm would change if the firm chose to impose on
itself the restriction that it will charge all customers the
same, single price for all units of output they purchase. At
first, I shall consider the effect that such a restriction will
have on a monopolistic firm. Then, once we have understood
this case, I shall consider the effect this restriction has
for firms operating in perfectly competitive markets.
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Recall that the demand curve facing a monopolistic firm
slopes downward as the quantity of output sold by the firm
increases. This negative slope of the monopolistic firm's
demand curve simply reflects the fact that the firm can sell
additional units of its output only at a lower price. Of
course, if the firm is restricted to charge the same price
for all units of output it sells, then if the firm does sell
an additional unit of output, it must lower the price on
all units of output it sells. Similarly, if the firm were
to sell one fewer units, it would be able to raise the price
it:charges for all units. Thus, when operating under the
restriction that it must charge the same, single price for
all units of output it sells, the maximum price the firm can
charge for its output will always be equal to the maximum
price any of the firm's customers would be willing to pay
for the last unit produced by the firm.
It is easy to see that when this restriction is imposed
the decision of whether or not to produce an additional unit
of output becomes much more important to the firm: If the
firm is allowed to discriminate in price among its customers,
then the firm will always increase its revenues--although
not always its profits--by selling additional units. When
the firm is constrained to charge the same price for all
units of output, total revenue becomes subject to two opposing
influences: since by selling an additional unit, the firm is
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increasing the quantity of output it sells, total revenue will
tend to increase. However, since to sell the additional unit,
the tirm must lower the price it charges for all units, total
revenue will tend to decrease.
We could imagine using the demand curve facing the firm
to calculate both the positive and negative impacts selling one
additional unit of output would have on the total revenues of
the firm. The net change in total revenue of these impacts
need not, of course, be always the same for all levels of
total output which the firm might supply to the market. If we
were to calculate the change in total revenue which would
result from selling one additional unit for all levels of
output which the firm might currently be producing, then we
would be able to define a function which relates the level of
output and the change in total revenue which would result from
producing and selling one additional unit. This function is
called the marginal revenue function of the firm.
A graph of a typical monopolistic firm's marginal revenue
curve would look something like the following. (see page 35).
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Demand and Marginal Revenue Curves
Notice that the marginal revenue curve lies always below
the firm's demand curve. This is due to the fact that at
any level of output, the firm can sell one additional unit only
by charging a price lower than the price it currently receives.
Notice also that the marginal revenue can be negative. This
will occur when the increase in total revenue due to an addi-
tional unit sold is outweighed by the decrease in total revenue
due to lowering the price of all output sufficiently, to sell
one additional unit.
A firm's marginal revenue function is conceptually
very similar to another function we have already discussed:
Demand Curve
Marginal Revenue
Curve
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the firm's marginal cost of production function. As you
remember, the firm's marginal cost of production function gives
-che cost of producing one additional unit of output for each
level of output at which the firm may be operating. The firm's
marginal revenue function gives the change in total revenue
which would result from selling an additional unit of output
for all levels of output which the firm might currently be
producing.
With these two concepts as background we may now state
the rule for maximizing profit when the constraint is imposed
that all customers must be charged the same price for each
unit of output they purchase:
Rule For Maximizing Profit Under a Non-Discriminating
One-Part Pricing System
Continue to produce and sell output until the
increase in total revenue resulting from the sale
of an additional unit of output is equal to the
cost of producing that unit of output.
Put another way therule is this:
Continue to produce and sell output until marginal
revenue becomes equal to marginal cost.
This rule defines the-optimal use of a non-discriminating,
one-part pricing system. The system is non-discriminating since
all customers are chraged the same price for each unit of output
they purchase. The system is a one-part system because
customers are charged only one price for the output they buy.
To see how this rule works, and to observe how the
profits it generates differ from those obtained under a discrim-
ianting one-part pricing system, we shall again consider the
case of a monopolistic firm with varying marginal costs. The
demand and marginal cost functions of our former example are
repeated in the following graph; in addition, however, the
firm's marginal revenue curve is now included.
Marginal Cost
Demand Curve
Curve
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Demand, Marqinal Revenue-and Marginal Cost Curves
If the firm follows the rule given above, then it will
produce Q units of output since for that quantity of output
marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue. If the firm
$
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prciduces more than Q units, then the cost of producing an
additional unit of output will exceed the increase in total
revenue that will be received if that unit is sold. Hence, the
*k
firm will lose money if it produces more than Q units. If
the firm were to produce less than Q units, then the cost
of producing an additional unit will be less than the increase
in total revenue that the firm would receive by selling the
additional unit. Thus, the firm would make money by producing
and selling the additional unit.
By referring to the demand curve facing the firm, we
see that at the optimal output level Q , the maximum price
that the firm can charge for its output and be sure of selling
it all is P**. The profit which would be earned by the firm
is equal to the total revenue it receives from selling Q
units; P * Q , minus the total cost of producing Q units,
which may be written as If MC(Q) dQ where MC is the firm's
marginal cost function. This amount of profit is represented
by the shaded area in the above graph.
One important fact to notice about the non-discriminating
one-part pricing system is that it is less profitable for a
monopolistic firm to use, than the discriminating one-part
pricing system. Under the discriminating one-part system,
the profits earned by the firm were equal to the entire area
between the demand curve facing the firm and the firm's
marginal cost curve. Under the non-discriminating one-part system
however, the firm's profits were equal to only a part of that
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area, and thus the monopolistic firm will earn less under a
non-discriminating one-part pricing system.
Let us now briefly consider what impact imposing the
restriction that all customers must be charged the same single
price for all units of output they purchase, has for firms
operating in a perfectly competitive market. The demand
curve facing a firm in a perfectly competitive market is a
flat horizontal line reflecting the fact that the maximum
price the firm can charge for its output is the going market
rate. We shall suppose that one firm operating in such a
competitive market has the demand and marginal.. cost curves
given-in the- following graph.
:ginal Cost
nand Curve
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Let us suppose the firm in our example wishes to use
a discriminating one-part pricing system to sell output to its
customers. Following the rule for the optimal use of this
system, the firm would, first, charge each customer the maximum
amount he is willing to pay for each unit he purchases, and
second continue to produce and sell output until the cost cf
producing an additional unit of output is equal to the maximum
price customers are willing to pay for that unit. The second
part of this rule would lead the firm to produce Q units
since the marginal cost of producing the Q*th unit is just
equal to the price the firm can sell it for in the market.
However, if the firm follows the first part of this rule and
charges each customer the maximum amount he is willing to pay,
the firm will end up always charging the same price, P*. Since
the market is perfectly competitive, no customer will be
willing to pay more than market price P*, and since the firm
can always sell its output for P , it will never charge less
than P*.
Thus, due to the nature of competitive markets, the dis-
criminating one part pricing system collapses into the non-
discriminating system: The optimal pricing strategy in a
competitive market is to voluntarily submit to the restriction
that all customers be charged the same single price for all
units of output they purchase. Thus, in competitive markets,
there is no advantage to using a discriminating rather than
a non-discriminating one-part pricing system.
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D- The Piece-Rate Pricing System
As you recall, under the Piece-Rate pricing system, linen
supplies charge a single price for each uniform, towel, table-
cloth, etc., which a customer soils. Aside from volume dis-
counts, each customer is charged the same piece-rate as every
other customer and each customer pays the same amount for each
piece of linen he soils whether it is his tenth or his fiftieth.
Thus, the Piece-Rate pricing system is a close approximation
to the non-discriminating one-part pricing system we have just
discussed. The good, or what I have called the unit of output
corresponds to a rental of a piece of linen of a given type.
The price-per-unit is, of course, just the piece-rate charged
for a particular type of linen. Thus, presumably the way to
maximize profits under a Piece-Rate system, will be to follow
i~he rule for maximizing profits under a non-discriminating
one-part pricing system: Continue to sell output until the
marginal cost of producing an additional unit becomes equal
to the marginal mvenue received from selling it.
In fact, however, the Piece-Rate pricing system is not
identical with the non-discriminating one part pricing system
we have been discussing. There are three important differences
each of which will require some refinements in our analysis
of the non-discriminating one-part pricing system, if that
system is to be used properly to explain the Piece-Rate
system.
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First, the analysis of the non-discriminating one-part
pricing system takes no account of critical customer size.
Yet, linen supplies which do use the Piece-Rate system often
find that some customers choose to receive such small amounts
of linen that the revenues they provide is less than the costs
of providing service to those customers. The issue of critical
customer size is, of course, entirely different from the issue
of the linen supply's marginal costs: Some customers are so
small that, at whatever level of total volume the plant is
operating and thus wherever the plant is on its marginal cost
function, it still will cost the linen supply more to
deliver to those customers than it would receive in revenue.
Unfortunately, I do not see any way of amending the
analysis so as to explicitly recognize the issue of critical
customer size. Thus, I am led to propose the rather ad hoc
measure of redefining the demand curves facing linen supplies
so as to exclude the quantities demanded by customers who
demand less than the critical customer size. In effect, by
this proposal I have assumed that linen supplies simply refuse
to provide service to potential customers ;whose linen require-
ments are less than the minimum customer size.
The second way in which the Piece-Rate pricing system
differs from the non-discriminating one-part pricing system
we have discussed is the fact that it is common practice for
linen supplies to offer volume discounts to large customers.
To the extent that these large customers are more price sensitive
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than smaller customers, this practice can be seen as a form
of price discrimination. Thus, when volume discounts are
offered to large price sensitive customers, the Piece-Rate
system could be seen as a version of a discriminating one-part
pricing system. If so, then one cannot help wondering about
the legality of granting such volume discounts. On the
other hand, if large customers are not more price sensitive
than smaller customers, the practice of granting volume dis-
counts is, in economic terms, inexplicable: A firm which
adopts this practice, in effect, is willing to accept less
profit than it would earn if it charged all customers the
same piece rate per unit.
Finally, my analysis of the non-discriminating one-part
pricing system assumed that the firm produced only one product
and hence that all the firm's costs could be traced in one
way or another to the product the firm is attempting to price.
A linen supply however provides its customers with many
different products and unfortunately for my analysis, many
of the costs a linen supply incurs are joint-costs vhich
cannot be precisely traced to any particular product.
Thus, how a linen supply plant manager should interpret the
rule, "Continue to sell output until the marginal cost of
producing an additional unit becomes equal to the marginal
revenue received from selling it," is not at all clear.
There are, I think, reasonable ways to resolve the
problem that joint costs in linen supplies raises for my
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ahalysis, but their presentation is rather lengthy and complex.
Hence, I will defer a discussion of these solutions until
Chapter V in which I shall present my recommendation for how
linen supplies should go about setting prices.
The problems of critical customer size, volume discounts
and joint costs are not unique to the Piece-Rate system.
Rather, elements of these same problems can be found in all of
the pricing systems commonly used by linen supplies. Since,
with the exception of the problem of joint costs, what little
I have to say concerning the solution of these problems I
have said in this section, I shall not re-say that little bit
in future chapters. Nonetheless, in reading my analysis of
other pricing systems, you should keep in mind that these
problems do exist, and thus, they introduce discrepancies
between the real-world pricing systems we shall discuss and
their idealized economic counterparts.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER TWO
I have chosen to speak of short term profit rather than
long term profit in order to avoid a discussion of whether
firms would be better off in the long term--i.e. over the
entire life of the firm if they forego optimizing short term
profit in order to keep competition at a fairly low level.
Briefly, the point is that if firms make too much money ih
the short term, other firms are likely to enter their markets,
thereby increasing competition and decreasing profits. The
trade-off between short and long term profit is an extremely
important issue which, however, is outside the scope of this
thesis.
CHAPTER III.
TWO-PART PRICING SYSTEMS
A two-part pricing system charges customers a per-unit
price for each unit purchased plus a lump sum fee for the right
to buy goods at that per unit price. Two-part pricing systems
are commonly used by a number of industries such as the office
equipment leasing industry, the short-term car rental industry,
amusement parks, private clubs and, as we shall see, the
linen supply industry. In each of these industries, customers
are charged for each unit of good they consume--hours of
computer time, document copies made, miles driven, amusement
rides, or rounds of golf played--plus a charge that must be
paid in order to consume these goods--a monthly equipment
rental, a daily car rental charge, an entrance fee to an
amusement park, or an entrance fee to a club.
In this chapter, I shall present the economic theory of
two-part pricing systems. Specifically, in Part I, I shall
discuss why a firm might wish to use a two-part pricing system.
In Part II, I shall discuss uniform two-part pricing systems,
that is two part pricing systems in which the right-to-buy
tariff charged is the same for all customers, and I shall use
this analysis to explain linen supplies' Piece Rate With a
Minimum pricing system. Finally in Part III, I shall consider
variable two part pricing systems, or two-part systems in
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which the right-to-buy tariff is varied depending on the number
of units the customer wishes to purchase. This type of pricing
system will be used to explain the Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee and the Flat Rate pricing systems.
Part I: General Analysis of Two-Part Pricing Systems
The demand curve faced by a firm records the highest price
that any customer would be willing to pay for the last unit of
output produced by the firm, as the total quantity of output
available for purchase increases. Alternatively, if the firm
is constrained to charge all customers the same price for each
unit of output they purchase, the demand curve may be thought
of as recording the maximum uniform price that the firm can
charge per unit of output and still sell all it produces.
The demand curve facing a firm may be analyzed into the
demand curves of the firm's individual customers. The demand
curve of an individual customer gives the maximum price he
would be willing to pay for the last unit of output he purchases,
or alternatively, if the customer is charged the same price
for all units he purchases, the demand curve of an individual
customer records the quantity of the firm's output that that
customer would purchase at-various prices per-unit of output.
Obviously, for any price the firm charges, the quantity of
output that the aggregate of the firm's customers would
purchase must be equal to sum of the quantities that
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individual customers are willing to purchase. Hence, the
demand curve facing the firm, which I shall henceforward call
the market demand curve, is equal to the sum of the demand
curves of the firm's individual customers. Thus, if a firm
sold its output only to one customer, then the market demand
curve would be identical with the c'emand curves of the firm's
one customer. If a firm sold its output only to two customers
then the market demand curve would be equal to the sum of the
demand curves of both customers.
We shall now consider why a monopolistic firm might wish
to charge its customers using a two-part pricing system.
Later on, we shall take up the question of how a two-part
pricing system might function in a perfectly competitive
marke~t.
Let us take as an example a monopolistic firm which has
constant marginal costs. For simplicity we shall assume that
the firm operates in a market of only two customers and that
the firm has decided to charge both customers the same price
for each unit of output they purchase. Following the
appropriate rule given in Chapter II, such a firm will con-
tinue to produce and sell output until the marginal cost of
producing an additional unit of output is equal to the marginal
rev nue which would be received from selling an additional
unit. This is depicted in the following graph:
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Profit Maximization for a Monopolistic Firm with
Constant Marginal Costs
The monopolistic firm will produce exactly Q units since
at that level of output, the marginal cost of producing one
additional unit of output is just equal to the marginal revenue
received from selling that additional unit. If only Q units
of output are available for purchase, then the firm will be
able to sell each of those units for a price of P as determined
from the market demand curve. The profit earned by the firm
will Tbe equal to the total revenue it receives, P .Q*, minus
the cost it incurred in producing those units MC-Q*. This
profit, P*.Q - MC.Q*, is represented by the shaded area in
the above graph.
P*
MC
We can distinguish the profits that would be earned by
the firm from selling to each of its two customers by replacing
the market demand curve in the above graph with the demand
curves of the individual customers. This is done in the follow-
ing two graphs.
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Profit Earned by Selling to Customer 1 at a
Price of P*
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arginal Cost
q* Output
Profit Earned by Selling to Customer 2 at a
Price of P*
By setting the price for a unit of output at P , the
firm earns a profit of P*.ql - MC.ql from selling units of
output to Customer 1. This amount of profit is represented by
the shaded area in the first graph. Similarly, at a price of
P*, the firm earns a profit of P*.q2* -MC-q 2 from selling units
of output to Customer 2 and this amount of profit is
represented in the second graph by the.shaded area. Since
ql+q 2 = Q the sum of the profits earned by selling to
Customer 1 and Customer 2 is e* Customer 1 and Customer 2 is equal to P Q -MCQ , the prcfit
p*
MC
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we determined the firm would earn by considering only the
market demand curve.
Let us now look more closely at the profit earned by
selling to Customer 1. Although he does pay the maximum
*th
amount he is willing to pay for his ql unit, Customer 1
is able to purchase his first ql -1 units at less than the
maximum amount he would be willing to pay. This surplus of
value achieved by Customer 1 under a non-discriminating one-
part pricing system is called Customer l's consumer surplus,
and in the above graph is defined by the triangular area
P-.A -B1 , or equivalently by Ip, I1(P)dP, the area beneath
Customer l's demand curve Il(P) and above the price line
*
P=P
We have already considered one pricing system the firm
might use to force Consumer 1 to surrender his consumer surplus.
That system, called the discriminating one-part pricing system,
required that the firm discriminate in the price it charged
customers for each unit of output purchased. When adapted
to insure that the firm receives the maximum amount that
Customer 1 would be willing to pay for the ql units he
purchases, the rule is the following:
(1) Charge Customer 1 the maximum amount he is
willing to pay for each unit of output he
purchases.
* 1(2) -Sell exactly ql units to customer 1.
The profit that would be earned by the firm should it follow
this pricing rule in selling its output to Customer 1 is
given by the shaded area in the following graph. Notice
that the increase in profit that the firm earns by adopting
this pricing policy, the area P*-A 1-B1, is exactly equal to
the consumer surplus enjoyed by Customer 1 under a non-dis-
criminating one-part pricing system.
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Using Price Discrimination
Obviously, the firm would like to receive the greater
profit that price discrimination will gain for it, but as we
have seen, there are legal constraints and high transactions cost
A1
MC
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which effectively disallow the firm from practising price
discrimination. Fortunately for the firm in our example, there
is another way of setting prices, two-part pricing, which
would be just as effective as price discrimination in forcing
Customer 1 to surrender the consumer surplus he enjoys by pur-
chasing ql units at a price of P . Fortunately also, two-part
pricing is a much easier system to use and infinitely more
legal!
A two-part pricing system, as the name implies, would
charge Customer I in two parts: Before Customer 1 were allowed
to purchase any of the firm's output, he would be sold the
right to buy the firm's output. Only after Customer 1 has paid
this right-to-buy tariff will he be permitted to pay a per-unit
price for each unit of output he purchases. If, as in our
example, it is assumed that Customer 1 will purchase only ql
units of output, then the per-unit price will be set at P*
and the right-to-buy tariff will be set equal to the consumer
surplus that Customer 1 would enjoy if he were allowed to
purchase ql units at a per-unit price of P . The profit
that the firm would earn by selling ql units of output to
Customer 1 is given in the following graph.
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In this graph, we can distinguish the profit earned by
the firm from charging the right-to-buy tariff and those
profits earned by charging a price per unit purchased by
Customer 1: The area P -B -C1-MC, shaded by negatively
sloped lines, is the profit earned by selling q 1 units to
Customer 1 at a price of P each. This profit is, of course,
just the profit that the firm would have received had the
firm charged Consumer 1 a non-discriminating, one-part price
of P*; that is, the rectangel P*-B 1-C1-MC is equal to the
firm's revenus fromunit sale , P
firm's revenues from unit sales, P .ql minus the marginal
A1
p*
MC
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costs of producing those units, MC-ql* The area P*-B-A1
shaded by positively sloped lines, is the profit the
firm earns by charging Customer 1 a right-to-buy tariff.
Notice that when a two-part pricing system is used, the
total profit earned from both per unit sales and the right-to-
buy tariff is exactly equal to the profit earned by price
discrimination, which is, in turn, the maximum amount of
profit which can be earned by the firm on sales of ql units
to Customer 1.
Let us now examine hDw the two-part pricing system may
be extended to Customer 2. As you recall, the demand curve
of Customer 2 lay always outside and to the left of Customer
l's demand curve. We may infer from this fact not only that
Customer 2 is a larger customer than Customer 1--at each price
per unit, Customer 2 is willing to purchase more units than
Customer 1--but also that Customer 2 has a larger consumer
surplus than Customer 1--for each unit of output he purchases,
Customer 2 is willing to pay a higher price than Customer 1.
How then should a two-part pricing system handle customers
with different sized consumer surpluses?
There are basically two alternatives:
First, the firm could attempt to charge customers with
larger consumer surpluses a larger right to buy tariff. Should
the firm choose this alternative, we shall say that the firm
has adopted a variable two-part pricing system, since the right-
to-buy tariff charged varies among customers. The advantages
57
of a variable two-part pricing system are obvious: By charging
a larger right to buy tariffs to customers with larger con-
sumer surpluses, the firm extracts more consumer surplus from
its customers and hence increases its total profits. However,
this method is fraught with legal danger. Since charging a
customer a right-to-buy tariff is essentially selling that
customer the right to purchase output from the firm, a firm
which charges customers different right-to-buy tariffs is
engaging in a subtle form of price discrimination among its
customers. Price discrimination which is unjustified on the
basis of different costs involved in selling to different cus-
tomers is, as we have seen, forbidden by the Robinson-Patman
Act. Hence, firms which do attempt to charge different cus-
tomers different right-to-buy tariffs must be extremely cautious.
In Part III of this chapter, we shall examine two systems for
charging different customers different right-to-buy tariffs
which seem to be permitted by the Robinson-Patman Act.
The second alternative is extremely simple. The firm
could charge customers with large consumer surpluses the same
right-to-buy tariff as it charges its customer with the
smallest consumer surplus. In effect, each customer is
charged a right-to-buy tariff equal to the smallest consumer
surplus belonging to any of the firm's customers. In this
second case, we will say that the firm has adopted a uniform
two-part tariff.
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If this second alternative were adopted by the firm in
our example, then Customer 2 would be charged a right-to-buy
tariff equal to that charged Customer 1. As was shown earlier,
the proper right-to-buy tariff to charge Customer 1 when the
per-unit charge is P* is equal to the consumer surplus
Consumer 1 would enjoy if he were allowed to purchase output
at a non-discriminating one-part price of P . Thus, the
profit that would be earned by the firm by selling output
to Customer 2 is depicted in the following graph.
irve for
.r 2
:ginal Cost
Output
Profit Earned by Selling q, Units to Customer 2
Using a Two-Part Tariff
$
A;
A
MC
92
59
As for Customer 1, we can distinguish the profit earned
by the firm from charging the right to buy tariff and those
profits earned by charg -::g a price per unit purchased by
Customer 2. The area P*- 2-C2-MC, shaded by negatively
sloped lines is the profit earned by selling q2 units to
Customer 2 at a price of P each. This profit is, of course,
just the profit that the firm would have received had the
firm charged Consumer 2 a non-discriminating one-part price of
P . That is, the rectangle P*-B2-C2-MC is equal to the firm's
revenues from unit sales, P q2 minus the marginal costs of
* t*
producing those units MC-q 2 . The area P -BI-A 1 , shaded
by positively sloped lines, is the profit the firm earns by
charging Customer 2 a right-to-buy tariff equal to that
charged Customer 1. Notice, however, that because Customer 2
has a larger consumer surplus han Customer 1, Customer 2
still retains some unexploited consumer surplus. He would
be willing to pay an amount greater than he is being charged
under our two-part pricing system to receive q2 units. Hence,
a two-part pricing system which is constrained to charge each
each customer the same right to buy tariff is a less than
perfectly profitable pricing system when used in a market
of two or more customers with consumer surpluses of unequal
sizes.
We have now calculated the profits that the firm would
earn by selling its output by way of a fixed tariff, two-part
pricing system for both Customer 1 and Customer 2. By adding
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these profits we may calculate the total profit that our firm
would earn.
The profit the firm earns through its charge of a right-
to-buy tariff is the same for Customer 1 and Customer 2. In
each case, the customer is charged the amount defined by the
area P*-Bl-A1 or, equivalently, :p, * 1 (P)dP, the consumer
surplus of Customer 1. Thus, the firm's total profit due to
its charge of a right-to-buy tariff is equal to 2f/p(P)dP.
The profit the firm earns through its sales of output at
a per unit price of P* differs, of course, between Customer 1
and Customer 2. Customer 1 is willing to purchase only q
units of output at a price of P and hence generates revenues
from those sales of P*.. Since it cost the firm MCql to
produce those units, the profit earned from unit sales to
Customer 1 is P ql -MC q1. Customer 2, however, is willing
* *
to purchase q2 units at a price of P and hence sales to
Customer 2 result in revenues of P*q2. The cost of producing
q2 units is MC q2 and hence the profit earned from unit sales
to Customer 2 is P q2-MCq. Total profit from unit sales
is then P*(ql+q )-MC(q! q2).
Total profit for the firm in our example therefore would
be equal to its profit on charging right to buy tariffs plus
its profit on unit sales:-
S=2 f 1 (P)dP + P(q+*q2) - MC(ql+q2)
Notice however that the firm's profit on unit sales,
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P(q-q*+q) -MC(q+q), is exactly the profit that the firm
would earn by charging both customers the same price for each
unit of its output as was shown earlier in this chapter. Hence,
the profit earned by the firm in our example using a uniform
two-part pricing system exceeds that which would be earned by
the firm if it used a non-discriminating one-part tariff. The
amount that was gained by using a two-part pricing system in
our example was equal to 21p, Tl(P)dP--the number of customers
times the smallest consumer surplus of any of the firm's
customers.
Let us now briefly consider how a firm which wishes to
use a two-part pricing system would fare in a perfectly competi-
tive market.
In a competitive market, the maximum per unit price the
firm can charge for its output is the going market rate.
However, since no customer would be willing to pay more than
the market price per unit for any unit of output he purchases,
no producer can capture the consumer surplus of any
customer. Thus, if the firm attempts to charge any right-
to-buy tariff the firm will drive all customers out of the
market for its products and into the market for its competitor's
products. In effect, the maximum right-to-buy tariff the
firm can charge is zero. At a zero right-to-buy tariff, of
course, a two-part pricing system is really no different than
a non-discriminating one-part pricing system. Thus, in
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perfectly competitive markets, a two-part pricing system has
no scope to operate. It can earn profits no greater than a
simple non-discriminating one-part system.
Part II: Uniform Two-Part Tariffs
A. Optimal Use
We have seen that a monopolistic firm can achieve higher
profit by using a two-part pricing system than it could by
using a non-discriminating one-part pricing system. That
demonstration was accomplished by setting the per-unit price
charged under the two-part tariff equal to P* the optimal price
to charge under a non-discriminating one-part tariff, thus
ensuring that the profit earned from the per-unit sales under
the two-part tariff would be exactly equal to the total profit
earned under a one-part tariff. Then, we simply charged both
customers a right-to-buy tariff equal to the smallest consumer
surplus of any of the firm's customers.
Although these gains may indeed seem substantial, it is
possible that the firm in our example could earn still greater
profits under a two-part pricing system. These additional
gains would come from two sources. First, the firm might
find that there is a more profitable combination of a per-unit
price and a right-to-buy .tariff than the one chosen in our
example. Second, the firm might choose to sets its per unit
price or its right-to-buy tariff at a high enough level to
drive the smaller of the two customers out of. the market.
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In this section I shall present rules to resolve each of
these issues.2 In company with the presentation of each rule,
I shall discuss a modification of the example given in Part I
(A) which will demonstrate the validity of the rule by showing
the increase in profit that a firm would earn by following the
rule.
Rule i: Optimal Combinations of Per-Unit and
Right to Buy Prices.
Under a two-part pricing system, a firm earns profit both
from its sales of individual units of output and from charging
a right to buy tariff. We might therefore write the profit
earned by a firm serving N customers who demand in aggregate X
units as
7r(N) = N-T + X'P - TC(X)
where T is the right-to-buy tariff, P is the price per unit
and TC(X) is the total cost of producing X units of output.
As we have seen, the largest right-to-buy tariff that can be
charged without driving customers out of the market is equal
to the smallest consumer surplus of any of the firm's customers.
The largest right-to-buy tariff that can be charged is therefore
equal to the area between the demand curve of the smallest
customer and the price set by the firm. Hence, we may
write the largest right-to-buy tariff the firm can charge
as a function of the per-unit price charged for output.
T* = CY(P) dp
Substituting the expression for T in the above equation, we
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fi-nd that profits are a function of just one parameter P.
We may therefore find the price P* which maximizes profit by
taking the derivative of the above equation, setting it equal
to zero and solving for P*. Doing so, we find,
P* = MC
1 + 1-NS 1
E
where S1 is the market share demanded by the smallest consumer
in the market and E is the price elasticity of the market demand
3
curve. (Details of this calculation are given in Appendix I
of this Chapter).
These calculations give rise to the following rule for
selecting the optimal combination of.a right-to-buy tariff and
a per-unit price for a firm operating in a given market:
Optimal Price Combination Rule
In a market of N customers, who in aggregate
would be willing to purchase X units of output,
a firm should charge a right to buy tariff T
equal to,
Ip* • (P) dP
and a per unit price P equal to
MC
1-NS
+( E 1
E
Where:
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Y, = the demand curve of the customer with the
smallest consumer surplus. Hence, Jp, * ! (P) dP is
equal to the smallest consumer surplus of any of the
N consumers in the market.
MC = Marginal Cost of Producing the Xth unit of output
E = The elasticity of the Market Demand Curve. That
is, E is equal to the percentage change in quantity
of output demanded due to a 1 per cent change in the
per unit price of output.
Sl = Market Share of the customer having the smallest
consumer surplus.
We shall now consider a modification of the example given
in Part I (A) which will demonstrate the merit of this rule.
Suppose that the two customers in the market described in
Part I have identical demand curves. At all prices the firm
charges per unit of its output each customer would be willing
to purchase the same quantity of output as the other
customer.
Let us now compare the method of selecting per unit and
right to buy tariffs used in Part I, with the rule just
developed. Following the reasoning in Part I, the firm would
produce that quantity of output such that the marginal cost of
producing an additional unit of output is exactly equal to the
marginal revenue which the firm would receive from its per unit
sales. The maximum uniform price which the firm could charge
per unit of output is then determined from the market demand
curve. In addition to this per unit price, the firm also
charges each customer a right-to-buy tariff equal to the con-
sumer surplus enjoyed by each of the firm's identical customers
at the given per unit price.
If the total quantity that the firm chooses to sell is Q
units and the maximum uniform price the firm can charge for
those Q units is P, then the maximum right-to-buy tariff the
firm can charge is pf (P)dP, the consumer surplus of one of
the firm's identical customers. Thus, the total profits the
firm would earn are given by the equation:
n = 2 *f p(P)dP + P-Q - TC(Q)
The profit that the firm earns on each of its two customers
is given in the following graph, in which the area shaded by
positively sloped lines represents the firm's profits from
charging a right to buy tariff of I p{(P)dP and the area
shaded by negatively sloped lines represent the profits due
to charging a price P per unit of output.
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Suppose now that the firm in our example were to follow
the rule presented above for determining the optimal combina-
tion of per-unit and right-to-buy tariffs. If so, then the
firm will charge a right to buy tariff T eaual to f Y(P) dp,
the smallest consumer surplus of any of the fiyrm's customers
and a per unit price of P* = MC Notice, however,
1 + (1-NS-)1
E
that since in our example all consumers demand exactly the
same mount of output. S1 the market share demanded by the
customer with the smallest consumer surplus is equal to 1/N.
I-NSHence, the term ( 1  becomes ecual to zero and hence the
optimal per-unit price P* is set equal to "C.the marginal cost
of producing one additional unit of output. By establishing a
new price P* equal to marginal cost, the firm in effect
and Curve for
Customer
Supply Curve
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agrees to sell each unit of output for the amount it costs the
firm to make that unit. Hence, the firm will make no profit
on its per-unit sales to either customer.
However, by lowering the per-unit price charged, the firm
has increased the maximum right-to-buy tariff the firm can
charge. When the per-unit price is set equal to marginal cost,
the maximum right to buy tariff the firm can charge is equal to
the consumer surplus enjoyed by either of the firm's customers
at a per unit price equal to marginal cost. The amount of
this consumer surplus is oMC '(P) dp or equivalently the area
between each customer's demand curve and the firm's marginal
cost curve. Thus, the firm's total profits may be expressed
by the following equation:
n = 2 YfMC T(P)dP + P .Q - TC(Q)
Or, since the firm's marginal costs are constant and since P*
is equal to the firm's marginal cost
= 2 * fMC T(P)dP + MC-Q - MC-Q
= 2 fMC Y(P)dP
The profit that the firm earns on each of its two customers
is given in the following graph.
urve for
A
p*=MC
Q"/2
Profit Earned from One of Two Identical Customers
Under a Uniform Two-Part Tariff.
As is apparent from this graph, the profits earned by
the firm increase when the firm follows the rule for selecting
the optimal combination of per unit and right-to-buy tariffs.
In a way, this result should not be surprising. At first,
we selected the optimal per-unit price P to charge according to
the rule for maximizing profit under a non-discriminating one-
part pricing system. However, when the firm is permitted to.
charge in two parts for its output, there is no guarantee that
the optimal per-unit price under a two-part pricing system will
be the same as the per-unit price under a one-part system.
Curve for
tomer
Marginal Cost
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Notice that in this example, the amount of profit earned
by the firm from its dealings with each customer is exactly
equal to the area between that customer's demand curve and the
firm's marginal cost curve. Thus, in this particular example,
the uniform two part pricing system was able to earn the same
amount of profit that the firm could earn by using a discrim-
inating one-part tariff. This profit, as we have seen, is the
maximum profit that the firm could earn by operating in that
given market.
Rule 2: Selecting the Proper Customer Mix
The idea on which the rule for selecting the proper customer
mix is based is really very simple. The maximum right-to-buy
tariff that the firm can charge its customers is fp '(P)dP, the
smallest consumer surplus of any of the firm's customers.
If one customer or one group of customers have very small
consumer surpluses relative to those of the firm's other
customers, then the firm may earn higher total profits, by ignor-
ing those customers with small consumer surpluses. The firm
would do this by charging a right-to-buy tariff which exceeds
the smallest of its customers' consumer surpluses, thus
effectively driving the customer with the smallest consumer
surplus from the market. If such a strategy is to be profitable,
the amount of profit the firm foregoes by driving some of its cus-
tomers from the market must be more than made up by the increase
in profit the firm earns by charging the customers remaining
in the market a higher right-to-buy tariff.
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The rule for selecting the optimal customer mix involves
two steps.
First, the firm should assume that all customers are
to remain in the market. The firm will use the rule for determin-
ing an optimal combination of per-unit and right-to-buy tariffs
to calculate the optimal prices to charge if all customers
remain in the market. Using these optimal prices, the firm
will calculate the profits it expects to earn, according to
the formula:
'w(N) = NT 1 + P1  X - TC(X N
Where
N = Number of customers
T = Right-to-buy tariff
P 1= Per-unit price
XN= Total Quantity Purchased by N Customers
TC(XN)= Total cost of producing X units
Second, the firm should assume that the customer with the
smallest consumer surplus is to be driven from the market. Again
the firm will use the rule for determining an optimal combination
of per-unit and right-to-buy tariffs, this time however for a
market which excludes the customcr with the s~allest consumer
surplus. Using the new optimal prices, the firm will again
calculate the profits it expects to earn:
7(N-1) = (N-l) T2 + P 2  XN--TC(X- )
If the profit earned is goeater when the customer with the
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smallest consumer surplus remains in the market, then the optimal
number of customers for the fir.m to deal with is N. If the profit
earned is greater when the customer with the smallest consumer
surplus is excluded from the market, then the firm should consider
excluding the customer with the second smallest consumer surplus,
and so on. The optimal mix of customers for the firm to deal
with will be those customers remaining when total profits cannot be
increased by excluding customers from the market.
More succinctly put, the rule for selecting the optimal
customer mix is this:
Optimal Customer-Mix Rule.
Continue to exclude customers from the market, in the
order of which remaining customer has the smallest consumer
surplus, until anticipated profits begin to decline.
To see how this rule works, let us consider again the two
customer market of Part I of this chapter. We shall assume that
the firm has constant marginal costs. We shall also suppose
that Customer 1 is much more price sensitive than Customer 2,
although when the per-unit price is set equal to marginal cost,
both Customer 1 and Customer 2 will choose to purchase the same
quantity of output. Specifically, we shall assume that when price
is set equal to marginal cost, the consumer surplus of Customer 2
is five times that of Customer 1. This market is depicted in the
following graph.
$MC
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Market of Two Customers
If the firm were to sell its output to both Customer 1
and Customer 2, then it would set the right-to-buy tariff
equal to the consumer surplus of Customer 1, fjp l1 (P)dP, and
charge the per-unit price P* calculated from the formula:
P* = MC
1-NS11+ E
In our example, the P* which satisfies this formula is P*=MC, as
can be easily verified by substituting 2 for N, the number of
customers and 1/2 for SI, the market share demanded by the cus-
tomer with the smallest consumer surplus at a per-unit price of P*.
Thus, since P* is equal to marginal cost, and since marginal costs
are constant, the total profit of the firm is given by the follow-
ing equations:
7T(2) = N-T* + P* • X-TC(X)
ýmand Curve For
Istomer 1
ýmand Curve For
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Marginal Cost
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= N T* + MC * X - MC * X
=N T*
= 2 T (P)dP
Let us now consider how the firm's profits would change if
Customer 1, the customer with the smallest consumer surplus were
excluded from the market.
If the firm were to sell its output only to Customer 2, it
would again calculate the optimal per-unit price from the
formula:
MC
1+ 1-NS 1
E
But since, in this case both N, the number of customers, and
S1 , the market share demanded by the smallest customer afe equal
to 1, the optimal price P* will again be equal to marginal cost.
The total profit earned by the firm will then be derived entirely
from the right-to-buy tariff charged Customer 2:
T(1) = MC 2 (P)dP + MC(X 2) - MC(X 2 )
-
2• (P)dP
Or, since at a per-unit price equal to marginal cost the
consumer surplus of Customer 2 was assumed to be five times
that of Customer 1:
n(1) = 5fCTl(P)dP
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Thus, the profits earned by the firm when Customer 1 is
excluded from the market are greater than when both customers
are allowed to remain in the market. In fact, the firm in our
example can increase its profits by 150% by driving Customer i
from the market.
B. Uniform Two-Part Pricing Systems for Linen Supplies
No customer of a linen supply ever sees an item on his
monthly bill:
Right to Buy Charge . ...... $10
Yet, there are ways that linen supplies can and do charge their
customers under a uniform two-part pricing system. The trick, of
course, if to disguise the right-to-buy charge in.a form which
seems fair or at least palatable to the customer.
One way in which linen supplies might implement a.;uniform
two-part pricing system would be to charge its customers a
fixed delivery charge for each type of linen they receive plus a
laundering fee for each piece of linen soiled. The delivery
charge for a particular type of linen would be charged monthly
and would be the same for all customers receiving that item
of linen. The laundering fee charged a customer would also be
different for each type of linen the customer uses, although
all customers would again be charged the same laundering fee
for the same type of linen.
This pricing system, which I shall call the Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system, is clearly a uniform
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two-part pricing system. Since nearly all customers of a
linen supply receive their linen by way of the linen supply's
delivery system, the delivery charge corresponds to the right-
to-buy tariff of a uniform two-part pricing system: Customers
can use a linen supply's products, and hence pay a per-unit
charge for each piece of linen they soil only if they receive
clean linen to start with. But since the way customers
receive clean linen is through the linen supply's delivery
system, customers can acquire the right to use a linen supply's
products, and pay a per-unit charge for each piece soiled,
only if they pay the delivery charges for each type of linen
they use. Hence, the delivery charge associated with a given
product is, in effect, a charge for the right to rent that
product at a given per-unit charge. This per-unit charge is,
of course, the laundering fee charged by the linen supply.
The Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee pricing system,
to my knowledge, is not currently used by any linen supply
to price any of its products. However, as we shall see in
the following chapter, linen supplies operating in some
markets would do well to adopt it.
One of the most cormon pricing systems used by linen
supply companies is the Piece-Rate With a Minimum system.
Un&er a Piece-Rate With a Minimum system, as you recall, the
customer is charged a per-unit price for each piece of linen
he soils subject to the requirement that he must purchase a
minimum dollar volume from the linen supply per month. This
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pricing system was invented by the linen supply industry
as a solution to the problem of critical customer size.
That is, since some customers may demand such small amounts
of linen at given prices that it is not profitable for the
linen supply to accept the business of such customers, linen
supplies needed a way to drive those customers from the market.
By establishing a monthly minimum for small customers, the
linen supply either forces its small customers to cover the
linen supply's cost of providing them linen service or drives
those customers fom the market.
Interestingly enough, the Piece-Rate with a Minimum pricing
system turns out to be a very subtle variety of uniform two-
part pricing system. Although the correspondence is not exact,
we may think of the required monthly minimum as the right-to-
buy tariff and the linen supply's various piece-rate charges
as the per-unit price charged under a two-part pricing system.
The minimum monthly charge is like a right-to-buy tariff in that,
if a customer wishes to rent any amount of linen at all, he
must pay the monthly minimum. The monthly minimum charge, how-
ever, is different from the right-to-buy tariff of the uniform
two part pricing system we have been considering in two respects:
First, by paying the required minimum, a customer acauires the
right to receive not just one but all of the products a linen
supply provides. Second, by paying the fee, a customer is
entitled to receive linen, at no extra charge, up to the
value of the monthly minimum fee. Similarly, the piece-rate
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price under a Piece-Rate with a Minimum pricing system is
different from the per-unit price of a uniform two-part
tariff in that it becomes effective only after the customer
exceeds his monthly minimum. Until that point, piece rate
prices are used merely to calculate how much of his minimum
a customer has used.
To see more exactly how the Piece-Rate with a Minimum
pricing system might be construed as a sort of uniform two-
part tariff, let us consider a market of two customers who are
served by a monopolistic linen supply with zero marginal costs.
To simplify matters, we shall assume that the linen supply.does
not grant volume discounts and that the linen supply provides
customers with only one type of linen. Thus, in our example,
we shall not be concerned with the problem of minimum customer
size, nor with the problem of volume discounts, nor with the
problem of joint costs in linen supplies. Also, since the
linen supply provides only one type of product, we shall have
the advantage of being able to refer to the required minimum
in terms of dollars or in units of linen soiled per month.
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Individual Demand Curves in a Market of Two Customers
Suppose for a moment that the linen supply were to ignore
Customer 2 and concentrate its efforts on fully exploiting the
smaller customer, Customer 1. To do this, the linen supply might
use a uniform two-part tariff of the sort we have been discus-
sing. It would set the per-unit price it charges for linen
equal to zero and charge Customer 1 a right-to-buy tariff equal
to the area fo ' 1(P)dP or, equivalently, the area O-A-B in the
above graph. By following such a strategy, the linen supply
rents Customer 1 exactly as many units of linen as is profitable,
q min units in the above graph, and charges Customer 1 the
maximum amount he is willing to pay to receive those q min units.
The linen supply, however, could have accomplished the
same end by charging Customer 1 a sirple piece-rate price of
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P , where P = J (P)dP and requiring that he purchase a
qmin
minimum of min units. Under these conditions, Customer 1
would just be willing to purchase qmin units since the total
amount Customer 1 would have to pay to receive a total of qmin
units is exactly to Customer l's consumer surplus:
p* fo T 1 (P)dP
min . minqmin
= 1 (P ) dP
If the same price and minimum were quoted to Customer 2,
then one of two things could happen.
First, if in the absence of a minimum at a price of P ,
Customer 2 would prefer to purchase less than qmin units, then
Customer 2 would purchase only the minimum number of units
required. We know that he would purchase at least the minimum
since his demand curve lies everywhere above that of Customer 1i,
and thus he would be willing to pay more for qmin units than
would Customer 1. How this would occur is depicted in the
following graph.
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Pricing System
If there were no minimum recuired and the piece-rate price
charged by the linen supply were L* where P iOH YlP)dP,
gmin
then Customer 2 would choose to receive only q2 units of linen,
less than the proposed minimum of q units. However, since
a minimum of q in units is required and since the amount it
costs to receive those units, P , is less than the maximum
amount that Customer 2 is willing to pay to receive qmin units,
he will choose to pay the minimum and receive a units. (The
"min
maximum amount Customer 2 would ba willing to pay to receive
qmin units is given in the above graph by the area O-B-B'-A'.)
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The linen supply's profits in this case are equal to twice
the piece-rate price times the monthly minimum; these profits
are represented by twice the shaded area in the above graph.
Under this alternative, the pricing strategy we derived
for fully exploiting Customer 1, remains the best strategy the
linen supply could follow when dealing with both customers:
If the linen supply were to increase the piece-rate price,
then it would have to decrease its minimum, or lose the busi-
ness of Customer 1. Yet, if it does decrease its minimum,
then both customers will demand less and the firm's profits will
fall. If the linen supply were to decrease its price, neither
customer would respond at least initially, by demanding more
linen and hence its profits would decline.
The second alternative which might occur is that at a
piece-rate price of P*= JoJ (P)dP , Customer 2 would prefer
qmin
to purchase more than the required minimum of qmin* This event
is depicted in the following graph.
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B = .min 2 Output1min 2
)Profit Earned Under a Piece-Rate with a Minimum
Pricing System
In this case, at a piece-rate price of P* the amount that
Customer 2 would choose to purchase in the absence of a minimum
is equal to q2 which is greater than the proposed minimum amin.
In effect, the'minimum is not binding on Customer 2: at a price
of P , Customer 2 will purchase q2 units independently of
whether or not a minimum of a is enforced by the linen supply.
The profit earned by the linen supply in this case is given
by the shaded area in the above graph. Notice that the linen
supply derives profit from two sources: it receives profit
equal to twice the consumer surplus of Customer 1 by charging
both customers a pieco-rate of P and requiring them to purchase
L
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at least qmin units at that price. Also, it receives profit
equal to the area min -q2-D-C from its sales to Customer 2
in excess of the required minimum.
Under this second alternative, it is no longer clear that
the pricing strategy we derived for fully exploiting Customer 1
remains the best strategy for the linen supply to follow. Since
the minimum requirement of qm n pieces of linen is not binding
on Customer 2 at a piece-rate price of P*, the linen supply
might be able to increase the profit it earns from Customer 2
by adjusting the piece rate-price it charges. However, since
any change in the piece-rate price or the minimum will decrease
the profits earned from Customer 1, the linen supply must
balance the gains that may be had from Customer 2 through
changing the piece-rate, with the losses it will suffer from
Customer 1.
Thus, we might state the problem faced by the linen
su,*piy in our example as follows:
Choose a piece-rate price P, and a monthly minimum M so
as to maximize total profit as given by the equation:
iT = 2-*P.- + P (- 2(P))
(Where e2 (P) is the quantity of linen demanded by the larger
customer in excess of the required minimum.)
Subject to:
(1) M < mi The monthly minimum must
-min be less than the maximum
amount customer 1 is willina
to purchase.
(2) p < fo 1(P)dP The piece-rate price and the
M monthly minimum must be set
so as to allow Customer 1
to remain in the market.
Having solved this constrained maximization problem, the
linen supply will then wish to compare the profit earned under
this solution with the profit that could be earned by excluding
the smaller customer from the market and using the Piece-Rate
with a Minimum Pricing System to fully exploit the larger
customer.
The rather complex formulation of the linen supply's
profit maximization problem under a Piece-Rate With a Minimum
pricing system, even in such a simple situation as the one we
have been considering, is a hint of the complexities that would
ensue were we to extend the analyses to more realistic situa-
tions. When a linen supply has more than two customers,- or
provides more than a single product, profit maximization under
the Piece-Rate with a Minimum becomes unfathomable. Fortunately,
as we shall see in the following chapter, other pricing systems
whose analyses are much easier, can be shown to produce profits
which are at least as great as those of the Piece-Rate With
a Minimum system.
Part III. Variable Two-Part Pricing Svstems
Under a variable two-part tariff, a firm charges its
customers tPo prices: First, the firm charges its customers
a right-to-buy tariff which varies in size from customer to
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customer. Second, the firm charges a per-unit price for each
unit of its output the customer purchases,and this per-unit
price is the same for all of the firm's customers.
Nearly all variable two-part pricing systems have one
fatal flaw: they are not legal. Recall that Sections 1 and 3
of the Robinson-Patman Act provide:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either
directly or indirectly, to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality, where either or any of
the purchases involved in such discrimination are
in commerce, where such commodities are sold for
use, cpnsurmption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of
Columbia or any insular possession or other place
under the jurisdiction of the United States, and
where the effect of such discrimination may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition~ or tend to create
a monopoly in any line c3 commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent cormpetition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of
them: Provided, that nothing herein contained shall
prevent differentials which make only due allowance
for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or
delivery resulting from the differing methods for
quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered.
Although the application of the Robinson-Patman Act to
variable two-part tariffs has not been tested, it would seem
that, barring very special circumstances, variable two-part
tariffs will not be allowed by the courts. Firms would seem
to be required by the phrase, "Provided that nothing herein
contained shall prevent differentials which make only allowance
for differences in . . . cost . . . " (emphasis added) to quote
its most costly customers a price equal to the price it
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charges its less costly customers plus the amount of the extra
cost the firm incurs in selling to its more costly customers.
When this restriction is applied, a variable two-part tariff
will not be significantly different from a uniform two-part
tariff, since the right to buy tariff charged different
customers can vary only slightly. Thus, the profits achieved
under a variable two-part system will be approximately. equal
to the profits achieved under a uniform two-part system.
The linen supply industry, however, may provide an excep-
tion to this general proscription of variable two-part tariffs.
From the customer's point of view, the good which a linen
supply provides is clean linens delivered regularly to him.
Yet, arguably, a linen supply is really providing two goods:
It is renting customers an inventory of linen, and it is wash-
ing those linens and returning them to customers. If linen
supplies only rented customers linen inventories, they would
be a very specialized sort of leasing company. If linen
supplies only washed and returned linens to its customers,
then they would not be linen supplies but laundries. Thus,
a linen supply would seem to have a right to charge customers
a price for each of the goods it provides. If so, then as
we shall see linen supplies can arrange the prices for the
two goods it provides in such a way as to establish a
variable two-part tariff.
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A. Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee as a Variable
Two Part Tariff
Under the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee pricing
system, the linen supply charges its customers in two parts.
First, the linen supply charges its customers a fee according
to the amount of linen inventory that the linen supply must
purchase and maintain in order to service each customer. The
amount of this monthly inventory charge varies among customers
depending on the quantity and types of linen each customer
uses. Second, the linen supply charges customers a laundering
fee for each piece of linen that it picks up soiled from the
customer, washes and returns clean to the customer. This iaunder-
ing fee is, of course, the same for all customers although the
fee will differ depending on the type of linen involved.
The Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee pricing system
is a sort of variable two-part tariff. The laundering fee
charged for a particular type of linen corresponds to the per-
unit of output price, and the inventory charge for a particular
customer corresponds to right-to-buy tariff of a variable two-
part pricing system. Since normally, a customer agrees that
only the linen supply will have the right to wash the linen
it delivers to the customer, by paying his monthly inventory
fee, the customer really only acquires the right to receive
clean linen in exchange for paying the appropriate laundering
fee. Thus, the inventory fee is a right-to-buy tariff. Since
the inventory fce charged a particular customer depends on the
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amount of linen inventory the linen supply maintains on his
behalf, and since different customers require different amounts
of inventory, the inventory fee charged customers will vary
from customer to customer. Thus, the inventory fee is a
variable right-to-buy tariff.
We may represent the profit that a linen supply would earn
on a given type of linen under an Inventory Charge Plus Launder-
ing Fee pricing system by the following equation.
S= T I (xi + P X - T(XN )il "N N
Where:
T = Inventory fee per unit of inventory
N = Number of customers
x. = Quantity of the given type of linen received
.thby the i customer
I(xi ) Quantity of inventory the linen supply must hold
th
to provide the i customer with X. units of linen
P = Laundering fee
XN = Total quantity of the given type of linen soiled
by N customers.
TC(XN ) = Total cost of providing customers with those Xn
units of linen.
What this equation says is, in effect, that the profits of the
linen supply are equal to the revenues it receives from charging
in inventory fee plus the revenues it receives from charging
a laundering fee minus its total costs. The profit maximization
problem faced by a linen supply wishing to use this system
is to select a laundering fee P, a per-unit of inventory charge T,
and a mix of customers N so as to maximize the profits given in
the above equation.
We may simplify the profit maximization problem of the
linen supply by establishing two rules very similar to the
rules set out above for maximizing a firm's profit under a
uniform two-part pricing system. That is, "<rst we shall define
a rule to determine the optimal combination 2 inventory fee and
laundering fee, assuming a given number of customers are allowed
to remain in the market. Second, we shall define a rule for
the firm to follow in order to select an optimal mix of
customers.
Rule i: Defining the Optimal Combination of Inventory
Fee and Launderinc Fee
Following the analysis for profit maximization under a uni-
form two-part pricing system, I shall begin the analysis of the
optimal mix of inventory fee and laundering fees by considering
what the greatest right-to-buy tariff is that the linen supply
could charge if the laundering fee is fixed and no customers
are to be driven from the market.
For a given laundering fee P, and a given number of customers
N, the maximum right-to-buy tariff the linen supply can charge
is equal to the smallest consumer surplus of any of the linen
supply's customers. That is, since a customer's consumer
surplus is equal to the maximum amount that that customer would
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be willing to pay for the right to receive linen at a laundering
fee of P, the largest amount that the linen supply can charge
for that right, without driving customers from the market, is
the smallest consumer surplus that any customer would enjoy at
a laundering fee price of P. However, under an Inventory Charge
Plus Laundering Fee system, the right-to-buy tariff is the
inventory charge, and the inventory charge a customer is
required to pay depends on the amount of inventory the linen
supply must hold to service that customer. Thus, the maximum
inventory fee the linen supply can charge per-unit of inventory
is the smallest amount per-unit of inventory that any customer
would be willing to pay for the right to receive linen at a
laundering fee of P. Equivalently, the maximum inventory fee
T* the linen supply can charge is the smallest ratio of consumer
surplus to inventory of all customers the linen supply serves:
SMin 1(P )dP p N (P)dP 
\
IO 1) ' I(xN)
Or, in abbreviated form,I Y.(P)dPT* = Min P
i=l to N I(x )
Thus, if Customer J is the customer with the smallest ratio of
consumer surplus to inventory, Customer J will be required to
pay.a total inventory charge exactly equal to his consumer
surplus:
Inventory Charge
for Customer J
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= T *I(x )
I(xj)
Y lpj(P)dP
Customer J need not always be the customer with the smallest
consumer surplus. In fact, a customer could have a very large
consumer surplus and still have the smallest ratio of consumer
surplus to inventory, if the inventory the linen supply held
on his behalf were very large.
When this expression for T is substituted into the equa-
tion describing a linen supply's profit under the Inventory
Charge Plus Laundering Fee pricing system, where the number
of customers N is assumed to be fixed, the linen supply's
profits are expressed as a function of one variable, the
laundering fee P.
= Min f iT(P)da I(x )+P.X TC(X N
i=l to N I( ) ii
Where the terms in this equation
pretations:
S (Larces
Min p i (Pe .
i=l to N Ifee thu
I(X withou
potent
market
have the following inter-
t per unit of inventory
e linen supply can charge
t driving any of its
ial customers from the
Ni=l
TC (XN
(xi) = Total inventory of linen (of the relevant
type) that the linen supply must hold to
service all N customers
XN = Total amount of linen soiled by customers
during one month
P = The laundering fee price
) = Total cost of providing N customers with X
pieces of linen during the month
To find that value of P for which the linen supply's profits
are maximized, we take the derivative of this equation and
set it equal to zero.
dXn ( Y (P)dP= 0 = X+ in - p  P
to N(
N
S i=l
dP
(f/ T.(P)dP N d(TC)
+d Min (x.) I(x i  dP
to N
dP
The laundering fee price P which satisfies this equation,
us call it P , is the optimal laundering fee price that the
:inen supply can charge. Of course, without knowing more about
the demand curves of linen supply's customers and the nature
of the linen supply's inventory-stocking policy, we cannot
solve for P . Let us therefore rely on current practice in
the linen supply industry and some common sense about customer
behavior to supply this missing bit of information.
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Specifically, I propose to make the following two assumptions:
First, the inventory a linen supply holds to service
customers, is determined by multiplying some constant by the
amount of linen those customers are expected to soil per month.
Thus, for a given customer K, the amount of inventory the
linen supply will hold to service customer K is:
I(xK ) = C • xK
That this assumption is reasonable is evident from the fact
that Steiner Corporation, a company which owns several linen
supplies, recommends that the initial stocking of a customer's
inventory of flat linen be calculated in just the fashion I
have described.4
Second, we shall also assume that customers respond to
relative changes in price rather than absolute changes in
price. Thus, when deciding on his response to a change in the
laundering fee price, a customer will consider the percentage
increase or decrease in price. A price change from 25¢ to
50¢ (a doubling in price) will elicit the same percentage
decrease in the quantity of linen received as would a
price increase from $1.00 to $2.00 (also a doubling in price).
Economists believe that, in general, this assumption better
describes people's behavior that the alternative assumption
that customers respond to absolute changes in price: an
increase in price from 25¢ to 50¢, (a doubling in price),
elicits the same response from customers as would an increase
from $2.00 to $2.25 (a 13% increase in price).
-L~-P~nrT~F.-~_l*-r~FFI~I·U~E--·~rS~-~SI
-J5
In order to incorporate this assumption into the analysis,
we shall take the demand curve of Customer J, the customer
with the smallest consumer surplus per unit of inventory remain-
ing in the market, to be of the form:
b
X. = aj P
where X is the number of linen pieces Customer J soils per
month, aj is same constant, P is the laundering fee and bj is
Customer J's constant price elasticity, and where b is assumed
to be less than negative one.5
When these two assumptions hold, the optimal laundering
fee price P is given by the following equation:
P MCEp* = MC • E1+ E - E+1
b +1
Where:
MC = Marginal Cost
E = Elasticity of market demand curve
bj = Price elasticity of customer with the smallest
consumer surplus per unit of inventory.
(b < -1).
(Calculations are included in Appendix II of this chapter).
Once the linen supply, has determined the optimal launder-
ing fee price P*, it can substitute P into the equation for
T* to determine the optimal per-unit of inventory fee to charge:cb b
S p* .ajP dPT =
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We may summarize these results by way of the following
rule for the optimal combination of inventory fee and laundering
fee:
Optimal Price Combination Rule
In a market of N customers, who demand in aggregate
XN units of linen, and in which the following conditions
hold:
(1) The amount of inventory held on behalf
of a customer receiving delivery at a
given frequency, is determined by multiply-
ing a constant by the quantity of linen
the customer is expected to soil each month
(different constants may be used for differ-
ent delivery frequencies);
(2) The customer with the smallest consumer
surplus per unit of inventory has a demand
curve of the form
b.
x. = ajP , b < -1
where x is the quantity of linen received by
the customer, aj is a constant, P is the launder-
ing fee and b is that customer's constant price
elasticity;
then, the linen supply should charge an inventory fee T
equal to,
f, a P dP
I(x )
and a laundering fee equal to:
MC-E
1+E - E+1
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where:
'b
ajP = Demand curve of the customer with the
smallest consumer surplus per-unit of
inventory of any customer remaining in
the market
I(xj)= Inventory held to service Customer J =
C.a P
MC = Marginal Cost
E = Price elasticity of market demand curve
b = Price elasticity of Customer J
Rule 2: Selecting the Optimal Customer Mix
Again following the analysis for profit maximization under.r
a uniform two-part pricing system, the linen supply will wish
to compare the profit it would earn by serving all customers
in the market with the profit it would earn by adjusting the
prices it charges so as to exclude the customer with the
smallest consumer surplus per-unit of inventory from the
market. The linen supply would thus use the above rule to
calculate the otpimal inventory fee and laundering fee when all
N customers remain in the market, and substitute those prices
into the profit equation for a linen supply using an Inventory
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system:
N
1 M*=T*= T I(x i ) +jP T
i=1
Where:
N
I(xi ) = Total quantity of inventory the linen
i=l supply must hold to provide service to
all N custoiiers.
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XN = Total quantity of linen soiled by N customers
TC = Total Cost
The linen supply will then apply the above rule to determine the
profit it would earn by serving all customers but the customer
with the smallest consumer surplus per-unit of inventory.
Again, it will substitute those values into the profit equation:
N-1
S= T I(x i ) + P XN- 1 - TC
i=l
The linen supply would continue this application of the
optimal price combination rule for successively smaller
groups of customers. The optimal group of customers for the
linen supply to serve will be that group for which the linen
supply's expected profits are the greatest.
Optimal Customer-Mix Rule:
Continue to exclude customers from the market in
the order of which remaining customer has the
smallest consumer surplus per-unit of inventory,
until anticipated profits begin to decline.
The complexity of these two rules definitely limits their
usefulness to a linen supply manager who prefers to set prices
by way of back-of-the envelope calculations. However, as we
shall see in Chapter V, if-the manager is willing to use a
computer program to assist him in setting prices, these
rules for the optimal use of the Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee pricing system may be quite useful. Computers
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after all, are much better suited to tedious and complicated
calculations than are ordinary mortals--especially time-pressed
linen supply managers.
B. The Flat Rate Pricing System as a Variable Two-Part Tariff
Under the Flat Rate pricing system customers are charged
according to the amount of linen the customer is expected to
soil rather-than according to the amount he actually does soil
each month. Thus, for example, if a particular customer is
expected to use 25 Turkish towels each month, then under the
Flat Rate system his monthly bill for Turkish towels will be
the same for months in which he actually uses 20 towels as-
for months in which he uses 25 towels.
The Flat Rate pricing system may be seen as a very special
sort .of variable two-part tariff. Recall that under a variable
two-part tariff, customers are charged two prices: a per-unit
price charged customers for each unit of output they receive,
and a right-to-buy tariff charged for the right to purchase
output at the per-unit price. Under a variable two-part
tariff, of course, different customers are charged different
right-to-buy tariffs, although all customers are charged the
same per-unit price. Under the special case in which the per-
unit price is set equal to zero, a variable two-part tariff
collapses into a pricing system in which different customers
are charged different amounts for the right to receive units
at no cost to the customer per-unit. This special case of a
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variable two-part pricing system, I believe, describes very
well the Flat Rate pricing system.
Under the Flat Rate system, the amount billed a customer
each month remains constant, although the amount of linen he
actually receives may vary from month to month. Thus, since
the amount billed under the flat rate system is not directly tied
to the amount of linen a customer actually uses, it would not
be proper to regard the flat rate charged a customer as a
price charged per-unit of linen. Rather, it is more reasonable
to think of the flat rate charged a particular customer as a
right-to-buy tariff. By paying his monthly flat rate, a
customer acquries the right to receive linen at no additional
cost. In effect, a customer pays a lump sum each month for the
right to receive linen at a per-unit of linen cost equal to
zero. Furthermore, since the flat rate charged a customer
depends on the amount of linen he is expected to use each month,
and since different customers are expected to use different
amounts of linen per month, different customers will be dcarged
different right-to-receive linen tariffs. Thus, the Flat Rate
pricing system is a sort of variable two-part tariff--ablbeit a
variable two-part tariff of a very special variety.
Under a Flat-Rate system, the profits a-linen supply
earns are equal to the sum" of the right-to-buy tariffs, or flat
rates it charges customers, less the total cost of providing
linen service to those customers. .e have seen that the maximum
right-to-buy tarlff that can be charc d a narticular customer
10).
is the amount of that customer's consumer surplus. Thus, when
the laundering fee price is set equal to zero, the largest
flat rate the linen supply can charge its ith customer is the
amount of his consumer surplus, which when expressed mathematic-
ally is the following:
co i (P )dP
Of course, if the linen supply is to steer clear of
price-discrimination charges, then the flat rates it charges
each customer must be clearly explicable in terms of the quanti-
ties each customer is expected to receive each month. Specific-
ally, it would seem reasonable to require that the linen supply
charge customers the same flat rate per-unit of linen that the
customer is expected to use:
Flat Rate Billed Flat Rate Billed
Customer I = Customner J
Quantity of Linen Quantity of Linen
Customer I Expects Customer J Expects
to Receive to Receive
There is, of course, no guarantee that when this this
restriction is imposed, the linen supply will be able to charge
both Customer I and Customer J the amount of their consumer
surpluses. In fact, both customers will be charged the maximum
amount they would be willing to pay for the right to receive
linen at a zero price per-unit only if,
IO I (P)dP I Yj(P)dP
Quantity of Linen Quantity of Linen
Custoer I Expects CustR•mrtJ Expects
to Receive to Receive
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But this will be true only in very rare circumstances. More com-
monly the linen supply will not be able to charge both customers
the amount of their consumer surpluses. If not, and if the linen
supply does not drive either customer from the market, then the
best the linen supply can do is to charge one of its customers a
flat rate equal to his consumer surplus and all other customers a
flat rate less than their consumer surpluses. The customer who
will be charged a flat rate equal to his consumer surplus is the
customer for which wY (P)dP is the smallest. For example,
Quantity of Linen
that Customer Expects
to. Receive
in a market of two customers, if
fo y1(P)dP f oT 2 (P)dP
where ql and q2 are the quantities of linen that Customer 1
and Customer 2 are respectively expected to receive, then Cus-
tomer 1 would be charged a flat rate equal to his consumer surplus:
Flat Rate Billed If (
Customer 1 o )d
However, due to our requirement that the linen supply charge cus-
tomers the same flat rate per-unit of linen that the customer is
expected to use, it must be the case that:
Flat Rate Billed Flat Rate Billed
Customer 2 Customer 1
91 = 2
o 1 (P )d P
Hence the flat rate billed Customer 2 is given by the following:
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Flat Rate Billed (P)dP
Customer 2 o q2
q1
The flat rate billed Customer 2 is, however, less than the
maximum amount he would be willing to pay for the right to
receive linen at a zero price percent:
Consumer Surplus 0
of Customer 2 o 2(P)d
Jo Iy(P)dP
q2 2
And since by assumption
fP T (P)dP fT VI(P)dP
q2 q1
Consumer Surplus fo '1 ( P )dP
of-Customer 2 > 1 q2
Consumer Surplus > Flat Rate Billed Customer 2
of Customer 2
This method of setting flat rates provides the linen
supply with as much revenue as possible under a flat rate
system in which both customers are allowed to remain in the
market. The flat rate charged Customer 1 cannot be increased
without charging him more than his consumer surplus, more than
he would be willing to pay for the right to receive linen at a
zero price per-unit. Similarly, th" flat rate billed Customer 2
cannot be increased without violating the condition that both
customers be chargod the same flat rate. per-unit of linen that
the customer is expected to use.
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The profit the linen supply would expect to earn is equal
to the sum of the flat rates charged both customers less the
expected total cost of providing linen to both customers:
E f' '(P)dPO +0 i q2 TY(+1 -I ". q2 
- TC(ql+2
T y(P)dP
l • ( 2) - TC(ql+q 2)
Because the revenue the linen supply would receive when all
customers are allowed to remain in the market is maximized by
the procedure for setting flat rates, the only way that the
linen supply can affect the amount of profit it expects to
receive is by driving customers from the market. Thus, in our
example, the linen supply will wish to calculate the expected
profit it would earn by driving Customer 1 from the market and
concentrating its efforts solely on supplying linens to
Customer 2.
When generalized to a market of more than two customers,
the arguments of this section yield the following rule for
maximizing profit under a Flat Rate pricing system.
Rule for Maxinizinq Profit Under a Flat Rate Pricing System:
For a market of N customers, and for a linen supply which
is constrained to set flat rates such that, for any two
customers, I and J:
Flat Rate Billed Flat Rate Billed
Customer I = Customer J
Quantity of Linen Quantity of Linen
Custom-er I Customer J
Expects to Soil Expects to Soil
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the linen supply will maximize its profits by following two
steps:
First, the linen supply should identify which of its N
potential customers has the smallest consumer surplus per unit
of linen the customer is expected to soil per month. That is,
the linen supply should determine which of its customers is
the customer K such that:
jo T (P)dP Mi Y0(P)dP
= Min
qK i=l to N qi
Where qK is the quantity of linen Customer K is expected to soil
each month and qi is the quantity of linen the ith customer
is expected to soil each month. The Customer K will be charged a
flat rate equal to his consumer surplus, fo (P)dP. The flat
oK
rates charged all other customers are then determined by the
flat rate charged Customer K and the requirement that for any
customer J:
Flat Rate Billed Flat Rate Billed
Customer K = Customer J
qK qJ
The linen supply should then calculate the profit it would
expect to earn by dealing with all N customers according to Uie
formula:
oo N
E(-) fo K (P) TC (
0K i=l i=L
Second, the linen supp.y should determine what expected
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profits would be if it excluded Customer K, the customer with
the smallest consumer surplus per unit of linen the customer
is expected to soil per month. The linen supply would do this
by identifying the customer that, next to Customer K, has the
smallest consumer surplus per unit of linen expected to be
soiled. This customer would be charged a flat rate equal to
his consumer surplus, and all other customers would be charged
flat rates consistent with the requirement that all customers
be charged the same flat rate per unit of linen expected
soiled. The flat rate calculated for Customer K will exceed
the amount of his consumer surplus, and thus drive him from the
market. The linen supply would then calculate the profit it
would expect to earn by excluding Customer K. If the linen
supply's expected profits decline when Customer K is excluded,
then expected profits are at a maximum when all N customers
remain in the market. If the linen supply's expected profits
increase when Customer K is excluded, then the linen supply
will wish to determine whether it can increase its expected
profits still more by excluding other customers from the market.
The linen supply's expected nrofits are at a maximum when the
result of excluding one additional customer from the market is
to decrease rather than increase excected profits.
In the following chapter, Chapter IV, I shall discuss
which of the four pricing systems discussed in this chapter--
Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee, Piece-Rate With a Minimum,
Inventory Charge Plus Lcaundecring Peoe, and Flat Rate--would be
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most profitable for linen supplies to use. The arguments of
that chapter will show that the linen supply industry could
make larger profits by abandoning its more traditional pricing
systems and adopting other systems which to date have not
received general acceptance in the industry.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER THREE
The rule for maximizing profits under a discriminating
one-part pricing system would actually require the firm to
continue to sell output to Customer 1 as long as the price
he is willing to pay is greater than marginal cost. I have
altered the rule here only for the purpose of the argument
I am constructing in order that Customer 1 will purchase only
ql units.
2The analysis I shall present is borrowed from an article
by Walter Y. Oi, "A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs For
a Mickey Mouse Monopoly," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
85, (February 1971), 77.
3The price elasticity of a demand curve is defined as the
percentage change in quantity demanded that results from a one
percent change in price. Thus, if the per-unit price were
raised 1% and the quantity demanded declined by 1% in response,
the demand curve would have an elasticity of -1. More precisely,
the price elasticity of a demand curve is:
P dX
X dP
where X is the quantity of output demanded.
4Steiner Corporation's Standard Operating Procedures Manual
recommends:
In stocking flat work on the first delivery for a
new account, install 125% of their estimated usage,
based upon frequency of delivery. This applies to
deliveries every 4 weeks, E.O.W., weekly, semiweekly,
or daily.
Thus, for flat work, inventory is determined by the equation:
Inventory = 1.25 * Amount Delivered
5 b5If a customer has a demand curve of the form X = a Pb
and if b is not less than negative one, then at any finite
price, PI' that custoT:ior would have an infinitely large
consumer surplus. That is, if b = -1, then the consumer surplus
the customer would enjoy is the following:
Consumer Surplus = J aP dP
p 1
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. x -1
= lim x aP dP
x+= p1
= lim (a In X- a n Pl)
But since, as X takes on larger and larger values, the logarythm
of X increases indefinitely,
lim (a In X - a In P1) =
If b > -1, we encounter a similar problem.
Consumer Surplus a pb dP
lirm f a Pb dP
X-*00
b+llim b+ a P
ax 1
b+l b+l
But if b > -1, then b+l will be positive. Hence, as X takes
b+blim a x b + l a a Pi nb+l P llim aX 1
x+ b+l b+1
Of course, the customer with smallest consurer surplus per unit
of inventory cannot have an infinitely large consumer surplus,
since that would imply his consumer surplus permit of inventory is
also infinite. Thus, I have restricted the price elasticity of
the consumer with the smallest consumer surplus to be less than
negative one.
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Appendix I
Derivation of the Optimal Combination f Pight-to-Buv
and Per-Unit Prices Under a Uniformi TTwo-Part Pricing System
The optimal combination of prices rule was developed by
Walter Y. Oi in his article, "A Disneyland Dilem:ma: Two-Part
Tariffs For a Mickey Mouse Monopoly" (Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 85, February 1971, pp. 77-94). His derivation
of the rule is the following:
Suppose initially that the monopoly establishes
a feasible tariff (consisting of a price P and lump
sum tax T) that insures that all N consumers remain in
the market for his product. The profits from this
feasible tariff are given by
(A.1) 7 = XP+NT-C(X). X= x.
j=1 I
Let ýj (P) describe the constant utility demand curve of
the jth consumer, T * is a function of the price P:00
(A.2) Tj= f j (P)dP.P
For any price P, profits can be increased by setting
the lump-sum tax T equal to the smallest of the NT
consumer surpluses that is assigned to the first con-
sumer; that is, -=? The demand for riCes by the smal-
lest consumer is t:hs determined by his constantSI- ) C"CE t:e" r a i-14 I-
utility domand, - .(P). Sin" e the rerai nin- N-l
consumers still eejov sIl ~or Ce consumer surolus, their
demands for rides de -.nd on the nrice P and net
incomes (0I -):
(A.3) x =D (P,M - T [j=2,3. . , .
[I]t is assumed that all N consumers must be kept in the
market. ConsCue·til , thie 7:: T s e:us ue t s td wienever
the price P is vaied in order to e-rl- ep s allest
consnur.er in the •r>t. 'The reuisite -_justmcnt is
(dT/dP- .-x . In this : :nner, to  1 7i-s, e.uation
(A.1), can h) r. uccd to a funpct•.sn o o• ont
parameiter, thre nice 'er ride P. Setting (d V/,a ) equal
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to zero, we get the equilibrium condition for an
optimum price P given a market of N consumers:
1-NS1
(A.4) c'=P L N+ \ E T
where E is the "total" price elasticity of the market
demand for rides;
N
j=2
N
(A. 5) E= (P +xX j=. \dP 1
~~··3- ·;
dxj NE+S
dm.
± j=2
where s=x 1 /X is the smallest consumer's share of the
market demand, .=x:.P/.•4 represents the budget share
devoted to variable outlays for rides, and A. is the
income elasticity of demand for rides. The optimum price
per ride is thus set to satisfv ecuation (A.4); by sub-
stituting this octimum price in equation (A.2) for the
smallest consumer (j=•1) we aet the optimum lump sum
tax T=T*. This p~roedure could conceptually be reneated
for any-number of consumers, n, thereby obtaining an
optimum tariff and constrained maxi.mum monopoly profits
7r(n) for a market of n consumers.
In differentiating profits r with respect to P, it must
be remembered that the market demand X is a function of P and T
via equation (A.3). Hence, we have
X +P + d \
_..L
dT dX dX dT
+ N - c' +P dP +d\dTL  1- V'A.
Recall that (dT/dP)=-x, and that (dx /dT)=-(dx /dM.).
get / 3
dX\ (dT
dT' \dP;
N
j=2
(dx.
dM.
j j
dX
dP j=i
Thus, we
dx. \
\dP
Collecting terms, we obtain
Sdx dx
d (X-xN)+(P-c') ,x
dP 1 j dP 1 j=2 dI, /
The "total" price eclsticity of the market dcmand E is defined
as follows:
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(Continuation of Footnote 3
S (dxI dx
The "total" price elasticity thus incorporates the induced
change in demand for rides resulting from the recuisite
adjustment in T when P is used. If we substitute, we get
dTr X(-s N)+P-c') EdP X 1 P(rj
Setting d7/dP equal to zero thus yields eauation (A.4). In
the expression for the "total" price elasticity, the term E
represents the price elasticity unadjusted for the induced
effect of changes in T. More precisely,
() ( rdX. i
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Appendix II:
Derivation of Optimal Price Combination Rule for the Inventory
Charge Plus Laundering Fee System
Profits from a particular product are given by the formula:
N
= T * I(X.)+P
-
X-TC
Where:
T=Inventory fee
J I(X.)=Total inventory held to service all customers
i=l
P=Laundering fee
X=Total quantity of linen soiled
TC=Total cost
These profits will be maximized when:
T I(X )
= d( i=l + d(P X) d(TC)
dP dP dP
To simplify the equation, we shall consider each of the three
component terms in this equation separately.
N
d(T l I(x.)(A)
dP
Suppose that the amount of inventory the linen supply
holds to service any customer is determined by multiplying
a constant by the quantity of linen that customer soils per
month. If that inventory multiple is C, then the total
inventory of the relevant type of linen the linen supply holds
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to service all customers may be expressed as follows;
N
I(x.) = C.X
i=l
where X;is the total quantity of linen soiled by all customers.
Suppose that the customer with the smallest consumer
surplus per unit of inventory, Customer J, has the constant
elasticity demand curve:
b.
x. = a. p
Where:
x. = Quantity of linen soiled at a laundering fee
Sof p
a. = A constant3
p = Laundering fee
b. = Price elasticity3
Thus, the largest inventory fee T the linen supply can charge
without driving customers from the market is the consumer
surplus of Customer J divided by the inventory held on behalf
of Customer J.
b.
T= f a. p 3
I(Xj)
S - , for b < -1. (See footnote 6)(b .+i)C N
Upon substituting these values in for T and il (x.)
we find:
115
d (T I(x ) b.+)CSTi= 1  i ]
dP dP
-P dX I X
(b.+l) dP (b.+l)
d(P*X)(B)
dP
The analysis of this term is relatively simple:
d(P-X) . dP
dP dP
=X + P
dX
+ P dP
dX
dP
(c) d (TC)
dP
The analysis of this term is also relatively simple:
d(TC) d(TC) . d(X)
dP dX dP
d (X)
= MC dP
Combining the analyzed forms of these
profits will be maximized only if:
P
-P dX X dX( -0 = (b +i) -dP (b 1-i) P
Multiplying throug< by P/X we obtain:
three terms, we find that
Cx
-P P P P dX
(b +-i) dP (b+I) X d P i? C,.P
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P dXOr, since X dP is equal to E, the price elasticity of the
market demand curve:
( = -P
(b 1 +1)
E P + p E - MC-E(b +l)
Rearranging terms, we find:
MC E
1+E- E+1
'b +1
CHAPTER IV
WHICH SORT OF TWO-PART PRICING SYSTEM IS BEST?
We saw in Chanter III that so long as a firm has some
degree of monopoly power, it can earn greater profit under a
two-part pricing system than it can under a non-discriminatory
one-part tariff. In competitive markets, however, we saw
that no advantage can be gained from using a two-part rather
than a one-part pricing system. Also in Chapter III, we
noticed that there are four types of two-part tariffs that
linen supplies might use:
o Piece-Rate With a Minimum1
o Flat-Rate
o Delivery Char,e Plus Laundering Fee
o Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee
In this chapter, we shal compare these four types of
pricing systems to determine which will provide monopolistic
linen supplies with the greatest profits. Since a linen
supply's profits are equal to the revenues it receives from
customers less its total cosecs of providing linen service,
we shall first wish to invcstica-te i;ahow a linen supply's
total costs maLy h~ affected b, the choice of a pricing
system. Having under sto h• .: total costs can be exnected
to differ under different pricinn systems, we shall then
be able to co-:•pare t•he >ofiail of the varicus pric .n•r
s yS t t7 .
1]17
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(a) Total Costs Under Various Pricing Systems
The total costs a linen supply incurs in providing its
customers with linen service are commonly divided into four
groups:
(1) Processing Costs. These costs include the
wages paid workers inside the plant, depreciation
of plant equipment, and the soap, detergent,
electricity, and fuel required to process linen.
(2) Inventory Costs. These are the costs of purchas-
ing and maintaining an inventory of linen adequate
to provide linen service to customers.
(3) Delivery Costs. These include the wages of
delivery drivers, fuel and maintenance of delivery
trucks.
(4) General and Administrative Costs. These costs
include the wages of office workers, depreciation
of office machinery, depreciation of the linen
supply plant building, and general overhead.
Depending on the type of pricing system a linen supply uses,
there will be different pressures on each of these cost
categories. That is, barring some corrective action by the
linen supply, there will be a tendency for the linen supply's
total costs to vary depending on the type of pricing system
selected.
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Many processing costs are fixed costs. Due to the
great durability of the equipment used in linen supplies,
the depreciation of machinery is not closely tied to the
quantity of linen processed by those machines. Although a
plant manager is generally free to add or to lay-off workers
inside the plant, he generally has little control over the
hours worked by the plant workers. Most linen supplies do
not operate near capacity and hence are not likely to work
overtime. On the other hand, due to union contracts and
to standard practice in the industry, plant workers are in
general guaranteed a minimum forty-hour week. Thus, the
processing costs that will vary with the quantity of linen
processed are to some extent labor costs, and the relatively
.insignificant costs of soap, detergent, electricity, fuel
and plastic wrap to package the linen bundles.
We may expect the quantity of linen processed, and
hence some part of processing costs, to vary under different
pricing systems, according to three factors: whether a
monthly minimum is required, the optimal laundering fee
charged, and the optimal right to buy tariff charged.
When a monthly minimum is required under a Piece-Rate
With a Minimum pricing system, customers are billed the
greater of the monthly minimum or what their linen bill
would be under a pure Piece-Rate system. At the piece-rate
prices the linen supply charges, some customers might
prefer to receive less than the requircd minimum. However,
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due to imposition of the minimum, these customers can expect
to be billed the amount of the minimum whether or not the
quantity of linen they actually use is large enough to
result in their being charged the minimum under a pure Piece-
Rate system. Since there is no difference in cost to these
customers between receiving the minimum amount of linen and
the amount they would prefer to receive in absence of a
required minimum, these small customers are likely to
increase the amount of linen they receive up to the required
monthly minimum. Thus, the effect of requiring a monthly
minimum is to increase the quantity of linen demanded by
small customers and hence to increase the linen supply's
processing costs.
Similarly, the right-to-buy tariff charged under a two
part pricing system may also have an effect on the total
quantity of linen soiled and hence, on the processing costs
of a linen supply. The right-to-buy tariff requires customers
to'pay a part of their consumer surpluses for the right to
receive linen at a given laundering fee. Under different
pricing systems, this right-to-buy tariff may be set at dif-
ferent levels and hence different customers may be driven
from the market for the linen supply's products. Thus, the
total quantity of linen demanded may vary under different
pricing systems if a different mix of customers is allowed to
remain in the market under different pricing systems.
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It is important to notice, however, that as long as the
linen supply provides service to the same group of customers
under different pricing systems, total costs will not depend on
the right-to-buy tariff charged by different pricing systems.
Since a right-to-buy tariff charges customers part of their
consumer surplus--part of what they would be willing to pay for
the right to receive linen at a given laundering fee--the
right-to-buy tariff will affect only the mix of customers which
are to remain in the market, not the quantity of linen those
customers will soil.
Inventory costs are entirely variable costs, since they
will vary only according to the quantity of linen soiled. The
larger the quantity of linen soiled, the larger will be the inven-
tory of linen that the linen supply must hold to provide its
customers with linen service. Thus, if a monthly minimum is
required, the linen supply can expect its inventory costs to be
greater than they otherw-.ise would be. -Similarly, the lower the
laundering fee, the greater will be the linen supply's inventory
costs. Again, if the linen supply deals with the same group
of customers, the richt-to-buy tariff charged under different
pricing sysitems will not affect the cuantitv of linen soiled
and hence will not affect the linen supply's inv:ntory costs.
Inventory costs however, are arfected by o her factors
than the quantity of line:i soiled. For example, some customers
are very concerned that they mighit run out of linen before
their ne:st delivery.
122
Thus, these customers have a tendency to stockpile linen in
amounts sufficient to allay their concerns. Of course, this
hoarding effect tends to increase the linen supply's inventory
costs: In addition to the appropriate amount of linen required
to provide a given customer with linen service, the linen
supply must also purchase a buffer supply of linen for the
customer to stockpile.
Under all pricing systems but the Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system, customers who do stockpile linen are
not charged any differently than customers who do not stock-
pile linen. Under the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee
pricing system, customers must pay an inventory fee on all
linen the linen supply holds on their behalf whether they use
,that inventory fully or not. Under all other. pricing systems,
it costs customers nothing to keep a larger than necessary
inventory of linen. Thus, all other things being equal,
the linen supply's inventory costs will be smaller under an
Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system than under any
other pricing system.
Linen supply plant managers, however, are rarely content
to allow all other things to remain equal. Plant managers
are aware of the effects of customerr stockpiling and when
they decide to use pricing systems other than the Inventory
Charge Plus Laundering Fee syst.em, they usually supolement
these pricing systems with some sort of inventory co~trol
program. Typically, under such programs, the dol 7 drivers
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are required to observe the inventory of linen each customer
keeps and report any excessive inventories to the plant
manager. The plant manager will then discuss the problem
with the offending customers and in most cases, succeeds in
reducing that customer's inventory.
Although no data exists on the effectiveness of these
inventory control programs, the general feeling in the
industry is that when other pricing systems are supplemented
with an inventory control program, the inventory cost advan-
tage of the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee pricing
system is not significant.
The Delivery Costs a linen supply incurs are fixed
costs. Most delivery drivers are not required to keep regular
hours and hence are not normally paid overtime wages. Within
a fairly broad range of the quantity of linen soiled and the
number of customers served, the linen supply will neither add
delivery drivers nor lay drivers off. This practise is due
not only to requirements of union contracts, but also because
the costs of adding or deleting a route are quite substantial:
When the decision is rmade to change the number of routes a
linen supply runs, normally the linen supply must replan its
entire delivery system. All stops of all routes for each day
of the five-day cycle must be reallocated over the new number
of routes. This reallocation is usually done not by computer
but manually, and hence is a very time consuming and expen.ive
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undertaking.
Of all the costs included under general and administra-
tive costs, the only cost which might conceivably vary among
pricing systems is bookkeeping cost. Some pricing systems
involve more detailed record-keeping and more complicated
calculations than other systems. Although for linen supplies
with manual billing systems these cost differences may be
considerable, most linen supplies do not have manual but
computerized billing systems. Hence for these linen supplies,
even the most complicated pricing system will increase general
and administrative costs by only a negligible amount.
In sum, the major differences in cost among the four
types of two-part pricing systems are due to whether or not a
minimum is required by the pricing system and to differences
in the optimal laundering fees and right-to-buy charges under
the various pricing systems. The imposition of a monthly
minimum will tend to increase the quantity of linen soiled
by small customers and hence will increase both processing
and inventory costs. Differences in the optimal laundering
fee and right-to-buy charges under various pricing systems will
also lead to differences in the quantitiy of linen soiled and
thus to differences in processinc costs and inventory costs.
B. Delivery Charge Plus Laun"erinq Fee vs. Piece-Rate With
a Minir:mum
As you recall, the Delivery Charge Plus Laun-i••ring Fee
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is a uniform two-part pricing system. Under the Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system, a linen supply chooses
a laundering fee to charge for each piece of each type of
linen the customer soils, and a delivery fee to charge cus-
tomers for each type of linen they receive. By its choice
of a laundering fee and delivery fee, a linen supply implicitly
chooses the number of customers it serves. According to the
analysis presented in Chapter III, the laundering fee corre-
sponds to the per-unit price and the delivery fee to the
right-to-buy tariff charged under a uniform two-part pricing
system.
The Piece-Rate With a Minimum pricing system is a special
sort of uniform two-part pricing system. Under the Piece-
Rate With a Minimum pricing system, the right-to-buy tariff
is the required monthly minimum. The monthly minimum is
different from most right-to-buy tariffs in two respects.
First, by paying the minimum, a customer acquires the riclh
to receive not just one, but all of the products of the linen
supply. Second, by paying the minimum, the customer is
entitled to receive a cuantity of linen upO to the amount of
the minimum at no adr tio'nal charge. The pi-ece-rate ch ar:ed
under the system corres-onds to the per-unit of outut
charge of a two -prar t T"-' I_ -" L.
charge of a two-part tariff. The pece-rate is also somewhat
different from most per-unit prices in that it becomes
effective only after ca 2to1,er has s i ~e d a uanti.t of•
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linen equal in value to the amount of the minimum. Until that
point, piece-rate prices are merely used to calculate how
much of his minimum the customer has used.
I shall argue that, in practise, linen supplies will never
wish to use the Piece-Rate With a Minimum pricing system. My
argument will have two parts: First, I shall argue that, in
general, a linen supply will be better off charging a right-
to-buy tariff on a product by product basis, as under the
Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system, rather than charg-
ing one right-to-buy tariff which applies to all products, as
under the Piece-Rate With a Minimum. system. Second, I shall
argue that even when the monthly minimum is assumed to apply
to only one product, the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee
system can provide larger profits than the Piece-Rate With a
Minimum system in all but the most rare circumstances.
What is at stake in the question of whether a linen
supply should set one overall right-to-buy tariff or a
different right-to-buy tariff for each of its products?
To answer this question, let us consider a linen supply which
serves N customers but which provides only two products,
towels and tablecloths, to those custo.ers.
If the linen supply were to set its right-to-buy tariffs
on a product by product.basis, then the maximum right-to-
buy tariff it can charge for each product is the amount of
the smallest consumer surplus belonging to any custome-r in
the final market for each product.
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If linen supply were to set a right-to-buy tariff on an
overall basis, then it would charge a single fee in exchange
for the right to receive both of the linen supply's products.
The maximu-m right-to-buy tariff the linen supply could charge
would, of course, be the smallest amount that any of its
customers would be willing to pay for that right. This, in
turn, is equal to the smallest total amount any customer
would be willing to pay for the right to receive towels
plus what he would be willing to pay for the right to receive
tablecloths. Thus, the maximum overall right-to-buy tariff
the linen supply could charge is equal to the smallest sum
of consumer surpluses that any one customer would enjoy from
purchasing both of the linen supply's products.
If the customer with the smallest consumer surplus for
towels wishes to receive only towels then the linen supply
can charge an overall right-to-buy tariff no larger than the
amount of consumer surplus of that customer, without driving
him from the market. If this customer were to receive only
towels, and if no customers are to be driven from the market,
then those customers who receive both towels and tablecloths
would pay an overall right-to-buy tariff equal to the right-
to-buy tariff for towels that thcy would pay if right-to-buy
tariffs were charged on a product by product basis. Thus,
by charging an overall right-to-buy tariff, the linen supply
would forego the revenues it could receive from charging
customers w•ho receive both towels and tablecloths a
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right-to-buy charge for tablecloths. Thus, the total revenues
the linen supply would collect from charging an overall right-
to-buy tariff will tend to be smaller than the total revenues
the linen supply would receive from charging a different right-
to-buy tariff for each product.
This example shows in the case of a two product linen
supply the problem that a full-service linen supply would
encounter by charging an overall right-to-buy tariff. A full-
service linen supply normally offers seventy-five to a hundred
different types of products, ranging from stove mitts and
kitchen aprons to barber towels and doctors' coats. No one
customer will ever wish to receive all the linen supply's
products. In fact, small customers usually receive only one
or two of the product.; available to them. Thus, the maximum
overall right-to-buy tariff the linen supply could charge
would be limited to what small customers would be willing to
pay for the one or two products they are interested in
receiving. As in the case of the two-product linen supply, a
full-service linen suvply would do better to divide its total
market into distinct product markets and set different right-
to-buy tariffs for eac-h product market, rather than to set
a single overall right-to--buy tariff.
Let us now turn to the second part of my argument in
which I shall show? ti•,•t even if separate minimums were
established for e ~ach -_ the linen su-ply's products, a linen
supply will normally >,.efer to use a Delivery Charge Plus
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Laundering Fee system rather than a Piece-Rate With a
Minimum system. T'ob make matters simple, we shall consider
an example in which a linen supply with constant marginal
costs offers one product to only two customers. Such a market
is depicted in the following graph.
Demand Curve for
Customer 1
Demand Curve for
Customer 2
Marginal Cost
qmin q 2 quantity
Market of Two Customers
Suppose that the linen supply in this example were to set
prices under the Piece-Rate With a Minimum system.
In this market, the optimal minimum to require is
q min, the maximum number of units it is profitable to rent
to the smaller customer, Customer 1. The optimal total amount
to bill Customer 1 is the maximum amount he would be willing
p$
MC
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to pay to receive those q min limits of linen, which in turn
is equal to the area under Customer l's demand curve between
the price axis and the quantity q min. Thus, the optimal
piece-rate to charge Customer 1 is the maximum amount he would
be willing to pay per-unit:1
P = jf 1 (P)dP + MC *qmin
MC
qmin
When a piece-rate price of P is charged, and a minimum of scnin
units of linen is required, the prbfits the linen supply,
earns from serving the smaller customer is equal to the maximum
total amount Customer 1 is willing to pay for q min units
less the total cost of providir- Customer 1 with those units:
Profit from * - total cost
Customer 1 min
Or, since marginal cost is constant:
Profit from * amin-MC min
Customer 1min - MC qmin
= (P-MC) min
Or, upon substituting in the above value for P , we find:
Profit from _ Y(P)dP
Customer 1 - C 1
The larger customer in this market will demand cq2 units
at a piece-rate price of P . As I have depicted matters,
q2 is greater than th•e rocuired miriTu Of qin units, and
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hence, the imposition of a monthly minimum will not affect the
quantity of linen soiled by Customer 2.2 The profit the linen
supply earns from renting linen to Customer 2 is equal to the
total amount charged Customer 2 less the total cost of providing
linen services to Customer 2:
Profit from
Customer 2 = P* " q2 - total cost
= (P* - MC)q 2
= (P* - MC)qmin + (P*-C)(q 2 - qmin
= 'C 'I1 (P)dP + (P*-MC)(q2-qmin
The tbtal profit the linen supply earns from serving both
customers is equal to the profit it earns from Customer 1 plus
the profit it earns from Customer 2:
Total Profit = (P*-MC)ain + (P*-MC)q
= (P*-MC)(qmin + -2 )
Or, since by our choice of a value for P* we have insured that,
110o
(P*-MC)q J (P)dP(P-C) in MC 1
we may write the total profit of the linen supply in the following
form:
Total Profit = 2 Y (P)d?+(P*-iMC) ( -q )
-MC 1 i2 miln
Each of these two ways of .writing the total profit the
linen supply earns has a differe.nt graphc icterrt +- at 'ion. It
will be important in the following analysis to recognize these
different graphic interpretations and to note that the profits
they express are identical.
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When the linen supply's total profits written in--the
form,
= (P*-MC) S(qmin+ 2)
then these profits correspond to the shaded area in the follow-
ing graph.
Demand Curve for
A
n// 
P- n
I It
~ 
1
Q.
min
Demand Curve
!.'arginal Cost
V
Profit Unrder a Piece-rl•t With. a .ni.um
AlternativelyI
linen supply' s
ing form:
=2 f
Sj~n c;( p (PýcZP% i the
total profits may be e::presced in the follow-
3PCJ +2 (P ~ -MC (c -
p*
MC
fo.-
Customer
culstorner
f"
y ul CI L A--L '-'.
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In this form, the total profits of the linen supply are
represented by the shaded area in the following graph.
emand Curve for
Customer I
amand Curve for
Customer 2
Margina I Cost
qmin q2 q uan y
Profit Under a Pi~c•-Rt- ei- -a Mi)-ium
Pricin¢ SvSc;;m
The onlyv difference betweon these two graphs Is that i
the former, the linen sunl's Dro-ci-s includc the triangle
B-C-D, while in the l~tter eraphl, the triangle P*-B-A is
substituted for triangle B-C-D. Since, however, we exress
profits the total amouci of profit .ust be the same, the
trianle P*-*B-A -ust be .naci. e u~"• in rao; to the tr -- .
B-C--D.
A
P*
MC
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Let us now consider the profit that the linen supply
could-earn under a Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee
system. In particular, we shall consider the version of the
Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system in which the deliv-
ery fee and laundering fee are given the following assignments:
Delivery Charge D = fI Y(P)dP
p*
Laundering Fee P = P*
Thus, the laundering fee charged will be equal to the optimal
piece-rate price P , and the delivery fee charged both cus-
tomers will be the consumer surplus that the smaller customer
would enjoy at a laundering fee of P .
Suppose that in absence of a required minimum, the
smaller customer would prefer to receive ql units at a
laundering fee of P*. Clearly, ql will be less than qmin
since the smaller customer would be willing to receive q
units of linen in absence of a required minimum only at a
per-unit price equal to marginal cost. The profits the linen
supply earns from serving the smaller customer, Customer 1,
are equal to the revenues it receives from charging Customer 1
a delivery fee plus the revenues the linen supply receives
from charging a laundering fee minus the total cost of pro-
.viuing Customer 1 with qa units of linen:
Profits from = D + P .ql - Total Cost
Customer I
f* 1 ' -ql · r
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At a laundering fee of P*, Customer 2 will be willing to
receive q2 units of linen. Thus, the profits the linen supply
earns from serving Customer 2 are equal to the revenue it
receives from charging Customer 2 a delivery fee plus the
revenue the linen supply receives from charging a laundering
fee minus the ttal cost of providing Customer 2 with q2 units
of linen:
Profits from = D + P q2 - Total Cost
Customer 2
my (P)dP + P • C * 2p *
The total profit the linen supply ýwould earn from serving
both customers is equal to the profit it earns from Customer 1
plus the profit it earns from Customer 2:
Total Profit = 2 ,' l(P)dP + (P*-MC) (ql+ 2)
In graphic form, these profits are equal to the shaded area
in the following diagram.
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Demand Curve for
Customer 1
Demand Curve for
Customer 2
Marginal Cost
ql q2 quantity
Total Profit UnCer a Delivery Charge Plus Laundering
Fee System
We shall now compare the profits earned under both systems.
To do so, it will be most convenient to consider the following
graph which eliminates the profits earned under both systems
and thus only depicts profits which are earned by one
system but not the other.
MC
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Demand Curve for
Customer 1
Demand Curve for
Customer 2
Marginal
Cost
qmin 2 quantity
Differences in Profits Betu.een tbe Piece-t •- With a
Minimum and the Delivery Chargqe Plus _Lund~e•in Fee
Pricin• Svste:s
In this graoh, the area labeled DC represents profits
earned by the Delivery Ch."-rge Plus L~ a.uderuing Fee system
which are not earned by the Piece-Rate Wih a M inimum system.
The area labeled PM are those profits earned by the Piece
Rate With a Minimum sys:tem but not earned b••y the Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fae System. Thus, the question of
which pricing system will prcduAce larger -profits can be
answered by determining -wheth::r th area DC is greater or es;
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than the area PM.
Notice that the area DC is identical to the triangle
P*-B-A. In discussing the Piece Rate With a Minimum system,
we observed that the triangle P*-B-A was equal in area to the
triangle B-C-D. Therefore, if the smaller customer, Customer
1, had a straight line demand curve, then the area B-C-D
would be equal to the area P24 since both would be equal to
half the area of the rectangle, B-C-D-E. Hence, the area
DC would be equal to the area PM and thus, the Delivery Charge
Plus Laundering Fee system would earn profits exactly euqal
to the maximum profits achievable under a Piece Rate With a
Minimum pricing system.
As we have seen, however, it is rather unlikely that a
customer will have a straight line demand curve. In the much
more common circumstance, customers demand curves will be
concave (like the inside of a bol), reflecting t/he fact that
customers will be willing to pay more for an additional piece
of linen when they currently receive few pieces of linen than
when they currently receive a large quantity of linen and hence
are nearly satiated. If the demand curve of Customer 1 is
concave, then the area PM- will be less than the triangular-
area B-C-D. Thus, since the area DC is equal to B-C-D, the
area DC will be greater than the area PM. The Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system, therefore, will provide
the linen supply with qrc, aer profits than t-.c maximum
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profits achievable under a Piece Rate With a Minimum system.
When this argumrent is generalized to a market of more
than two customers, the complexity of the argument increases
substantially, but the basic result of the argument does not
change: As long as at least half of the linen supply's cus-
tomers would be willing to receive more than the required
minimum number of linen pieces at the given piece-rate price,
the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system will always
be able to produce profits at least equal to the maximum
profits achievable under the Piece-Rate With a Minimum
system.3
It is quite reasonable to expect this condition to be
satisfied in nearly all markets in which linen supplies
operate. Recall that the optimal minimum to require can be no
greater than the maximum amount the customer with the smallest
consumer surplus would receive at a piece-rate equal to marginal
cost. Of course, for custcmers with identical orice elastici-
ties, the smaller a customer's consumer surplus, the smaller
will be the quantity he demands at all piece-rate prices,
including the piece-rate equal to marginal cost. Therefore,
since different price clasticities seem to be randomly
distributed among various sizes of customers, one would ex;pect
the customer with the  -smallest consumer surplus to be a
fairly small customer. Hence, the optimal minimum to require
will nearly• alays bDe less than w,-.t -half the linen s.ply'
custo-mers; would be willing to receive at the optimal piece--
rate pric.,
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In sum, there are two reasons to believe that linen
Ssupplies will prefer to use the Delivery Charge Plus Launder-
ing Fee pricing system rather than the Piece-Rate With a
Minimum system. First, the Piece-Rate With a Minimum System
charges an overall right-to-buy tariff rather than different
right-to-buy tariffs for each product. In general, since
most customers receive only a few of the linen supply's
products, the maximum overall right-to-buy tariff the linen
supply can charge will be less than the sum of the right-to-
buy tariffs it charges on a product-by-product basis. Thus,
the linen supply's profits will tend to be smaller under the
PieceRate With a Minimum system than under a system such
as the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system, which
charges different right-to-buy tariffs for each product.
Second, even if separate minimums were established for each
of the linen supply's products, the Delivery Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system will earn greater profits than the
Piece Rate With a Minimum in nearly all cases.
C. Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee vs. Flat Rate
The Flat Rate pricing system is a special sort of vari-
able two-part pricing system in which the per-unit of output
price is set equal to zero. The Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee pricing system is also a sort. of variable
two-part tariff, but under this system the per-unit of output
price need not be set equal to zero. Thus, it is not
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surprising that in nearly all cases the Inventory Charge
Plus Laundering Fee system will provide a linen supply with
greater profit than it would earn under a Flat Rate system.
In fact, only in the very special case in which the optimal
per-unit price (laundering fee) of an Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system is exactly equal to zero will the pro-
fits under a Flat Rate system be as large as those a linen
supply would earn under an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering
Fee dystem.
As you recall, under the Flat Rate system, the only
variable of choice open to the linen supply is N, the number
of customers it chooses to serve. Once the linen supply has
determined the optimal number of customers to serve, N*, the
setting of flat rates for its customers is an entirely mechan-
ical procedure. The linen supply must first identify which
of its N customers has the smallest consumer surplus per
unit of linen the customer is expected to soil each month.
That is, the linen supply should determine which of its
customers is the Customer K such that:
fo 00 (P)dP Mn (P)dP
q i=1l to N qi
where qK is the quantity of linen Customer K is expected to
soil each month and qi is the quantity of linen the ith
customer is expected to2 soil each month.
The customer XK'is charged a flat rate equal to his
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consumer surplus, ft ~TPIdP , The flat rates charged
qK
Customer K and the requirement imposed in order to insure
compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act, that for any
customer j:
Flat Rate Billed Flat Rate Billed
Customer K Customer j
qK qj
The linen supply would then expect to earn the profits given
in the following equation:
N*.
7 = o K(P)dP 7i - TCF
.i=l
qK
NA
where L qi is the total quantity of linen expected to be
i=1
soiled and TCF are the linen supply's total costs under the
flat rate system.
As you recall, under the Inventory Charge Plus Launder-
ing system, a linen supply chooses a laundering fee to charge
customers for each unit of linen the customer soils and an
inventory fee to charge for each unit of linen the linen
supply must purchase and maintain to service the customer.
By its choice of a laundering fee and inventory fee, a
linen supply iinplicitly chooses the number of customers it
serves. According to the analysis presented in Chapter III,
the laundering fee:corresponds to the per-unit price, and the
inventory fee to thf right-to-buy tariff charged under a
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two-part pricing system.
In order to show that an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering
Fee pricing system is better for a linen supply to use than a
Flat Rate system, it is sufficient to show that there is some,
not necessarily optimal, assignment of values to the inventory
price T and the laundering fee P which will produce profit
equal to the profit that a linen supply would expect to earn
from the optimal use of the Flat Rate system. If there is
Rome such assignment, then when the Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system is used to its best advantage, it can
be relied on to produce profits at least as large as those
produced under a Flat Rate system. The profit that a linen
supply earns under an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee
pricing system generally is given by the following equation:
N
= T * I(X.1 + P • X - TC
i-i
where;
T = Inventory fee per-unit of linen
N = Number of customers
I(Xi) = Amount of inventory the linen supply must hold to
th
service the i customer assuming weekly delivery.
N
Thus, I I(Xi) is the total inventory held by
i=l
the. linen supply.
P = Laundering fge per-unit of linen
X = Total quantity of linen soiled per month
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TC = Total cost under the Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system.
Consider now the following assignment for the inventory fee
and laundering fee under an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering
Fee pricing system.
Laundering Fee P = 0
Inventory Eee T = fo TK(P ) d P
Per-Unit of Inventory C . qK
where C is the inventory multiple the linen supply uses to
calculate the optimal amount of inventory to hold, given
the quantity of linen a customer soils per-month.
'Upon substituting these values in for T and P in the
equdtion for the linen supply's expected profit, we find;
N
S o K (P ) d P  I(X i ) + O * X - TC
C - qK i=1
Or, since the inventory a linen supply holds to service a
given customer is determined by multiplying an inventory
multiple.C by the quantity of linen a customer is expected
to soil each month, we may write the linen supply's profit
in the following form:
N
'fYK (P)dP "C Cq - TCoKi=l
C * qK
N
I T K ( P ) dP a. - TC
q i=1qK
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Thus, this assignment of values to the prices charged
under an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system
results in each customer being charged the 'same right-to-buy
tariff and the same per-unit price that they would be charged
under a Flat-Rate system: Each customer is charged a launder-
ing fee equal to zero and each customer ends up paying a
0 0 K (P)dP
right-to-buy tariff equal to o K dP  times the amount of
qK
linen he expects to soil each month. Hence, this version
of the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system will
drive no customers from the market, and will generate revenues
identical to those under the Flat-Rate system. Furthermore,
since for systems not requiring a monthly minimum, the only
difference in total costs will be due to different right-to-
buy and per-unit prices, the linen supply's total costs should
be the same under this version of the Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system as under the Flat Rate system. Thus,
this version of the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee
system will produce expected profits exactly equal to the
maximum profits the linen supply could expect to earn under an
optimal'use of the flat Rate system.
Since the assignment of values to the inventory fee
and laundering fee under this version will be an optimal
selection of values for the inventory fee and laundering fee
only in very special circumstances, we may expect that in
most situations an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee
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pricing s-stem will produce profits not just equal to, but
greater than the linen supply would earn under the Flat-Rate
system.
D, Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee vs. Delivery Charge
Plus Laundering Fee
Neither the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee pricing
system nor the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee pricing
system is best under all circumstances. In some markets,
it will be more profitable to charge customers a variable
right-to-buy tariff in the form of an inventory price per-
unit of inventory. In other markets, it will be better for a
linen supply to charge customers a uniform right-to-buy
tariff by charging the same delivery fee to all customers for
the right to receive a given product.
An example of a market in which a linen supply would do
better to use an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system
rather than a Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system is
given in the following graph. This market has the spe,
cial feature that of the two customers on the market, Customer
2 demands twice as much linen as Customer 1 at all laundering
fees the linen supply might set.
- - . ---- ,,-,-· -,--·x ,-.- -----. *.----.- - -- I
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Demand and Marginal Cost Curves for a Market
of Two Customers
.If we represent the demand curve of Customer 1 as (P),
then since Customer 2 demands twice as much as Customer 1 at
any laundering fee price, we may write the demand curve of
Customer 2 as either 2 (P) or 2 1I(P).
Let us suppose that the optimal prices for the linen suppl
to charge under a Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system are
the following:
Optimal Laundering Fee = P*
Optimal Delivery Fee = D* = j'4. (P)dP
The profit that a monopolistic linen supply earns by
using a Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee pricing system is
given by the following equation:
S
MC
ly
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= N * D + P X - TCD
where
N = Number of customers
D = Delivery charge
P = Laundering fee
X = Total quantity of linen soiled
TCD = Total cost of providing linen under a Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system.
Thus, the maximum profit that the linen supply in our example
could earn under the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system
is given by substituting these values for D and P into the equa-
tion for the linen supply's profits.
-=2 * J•~lY(P)dP + p* X- TC
We shall now consider what profit the linen supply would
earn in this market under an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering
Fee system. Let us suppose that the linen supply sets the
laundering fee under an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee
system equal to P*, the optimal laundering fee under the Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system. If the laundering fee
charged by the linen supply is P*, then the maximum inventory
fee T that the linen supply can charge is equal to the smallest
consumer surplus per-unit of inventory of either customer:
T* = Min p* 1(P)dP J* T2(PdP
C * X1 C * X2
However, since at all laundering fee prices Customer 2 demands
twice the amount of linen demanded by Customer 1, the consumer
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surplus of Customer 2 will be twice that of Customer 1.
Consumer Surplus / O (P)dP
of Customer 2 = p 2
J' 2i1 (P)dP
= 2fpl(P)dP
Also, Customer 2 will require twice the amount of inventory
that Customer 1 requires:
C - x2 = 2 * C - xl
Thus, both customers will have the same consumer surplus per
unit of inventory:
T*= 1(P)dP =2 O * T1(P)dP
C * x1  2 C xI
* 2 (P)dP
C . x2C·X 2
The profit that a linen supply earns from using an
Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system is given by the
following equation.
N
S= T - C x. + P X - TC
i=l
where
T = Inventory Fee
N
c.x.= Total inventory the linen supply holds to service
i=l
all customers
P = Laundering fee-
X = Total quantity of linen soiled
TC I = Total cost under an Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system
N
Substituting in values for T, P and ~ C * xi, we obtain:
i1=
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= 1(P)dP C * xl + fp, 2 (P)dP . x
C xi  C x 2
+ P* . X - TCI
= fp*c (P)dP + fj~* 2 (P)dP + P* X - TC
Or since the consumer surplus of Customer 2 is twice that of
Customer 1,
0 3 .f*p• 1 (P)dP + P* X - TC
We have seen that the major differences in cost that arise
between two different pricing systems is due to the difference
in the quantity of linen soiled under the two systems. This
difference in the quantity of linen soiled will arise either
,because one system requires a minimum, or because one system
,selects a laundering fee less than the other, or because one
system sets its right-to-buy tariff higher-than the other and
hence drives more customers from the market. In the present
case, no difference in total cost can be expected to arise
from any of these sources: No minimums are required by either
system. We have not allowed the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering
Fee system to drive either customer from the market. Also, we
have set the laundering fee under the Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system equal to P*, the optimal laundering fee
under the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system and
thereby insured that the quantity of linen soiled will be the
same under both systems. Hence, the linen supply's total
costs will be the same under both systems.
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If so, then it is apparent that in this market, the
Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system will earn larger
profits than the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system.
Both pricing systems secured revenues equal to P * X from
the charge of a laundering fee. The Delivery Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system secured 2 f j 71(P)dP from its charge
.of a right-to-buy tariff. Yet, the revenues received under
the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system from its charge
of a right-to-buy tariff were 3 - f 1 (P)dP. Thus, in this
market, the profits earned under the Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system exceed those that the linen supply would
earn under the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system.
The derivation of this result depended on the rather strong
assumption that at each laundering fee price, both customers
differed in the quantity of linen demanded by a certain constant
multiple. However, in rder for the Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee pricing system to be superior to the Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system, this particular assumption
need not hold. In fact, it is not difficult to show that a
monopolistic linen supply will prefer to use the Inventory Charge
Plus Laundering Fee system so long as the amount of inventory
the linen supply holds to service the customer with the smallest
consumer surplus per-unit of inventory, is less than the average
amount of inventory held per customer. That is, in a monopolistic
th
market of N customers, where i(P) is the i customer's demand
th
curve, I(Xi) is the amount of inventory held for the i customeri
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and where P* is the optimal laundering fee under the Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system, if Customer J is the customer
such that,
j (P)dP Min /p* i ( P ) dP
= i=l to N
I(Xj) I(X i )
and if
N
I(Xj) < I)Xi )
-i=l1
N
then the linen supply will earn greater profit under an
Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system than it would earn
under a Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system.6
As we shall now see, however, in some markets a linen
supply would do better to use a Delivery Charge Plus Laundering
Fee system rather than an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee
system.
Consider the market of two customers given in the follow-
ing graph. This market has two special features: First, the
area between the demand curve of Customer 2 and the price
line P* is exactly equal to the corresponding area for
Customer 1, and thus at a laundering fee price of. P* Customer
1 and Customer 2 have identical consumer surpluses. Second
at a laundering fee price of P*, Customer 2 will choose to
receive exactly twice the amount of linen that Customer 1
receives.
P*
MC
xl 2 XljX 2  quantity
Demand and Marginal Cost Curves For a Market of
Two Customers
To make things simple, let us suppose that under an
Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee pricing system, the
optimal laundering fee price to charge is P* The optimal
inventory price to charge per unit of inventory is then the
smallest consumer surplus per-unit of inventory that either
customer would enjoy at a laundering fee price of P*;
*i (P ) dP f 2 (P)dP
T* = Min .. *C x C x2
(where the numerator in each fraction is the consumer surplus
of each customer and the denominator is the amount of inventory
ind Curve
Customer 1
ad Curve
3ustomer 2
Marginal
Cost
.I q 14
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that the linen supply must hold to service each customer).
Since by assumption, both customers have the same consumer
surplus at a laundering fee price of P*, then
I( T1 (P)dP = rp*Y2(P) dP
Furthermore, we have assumed that at a laundering fee price
6f P*, Customer 2 will demand twice the amount of linen that
Customer 1 demands. Hence, since the amount of -inventory
the linen supply holds for a civen customer is
determined by multiplying the quantity of linen demanded by
that customer by some constant, the amount of linen the linen
supply holds for Customer 2 must be twice that it holds for
Customer 1.
Thus, we find that Customer 2 has smaller
per unit of inventory than does Customer 1:
•T2 ( P ) dP 1 p* 1(P)dP
C 2 C .2 11C. 2 2 C
The optimal inventory price to charge per unit of inventory is
therefore Customer 2's consumer.surplus per-unit of inventory
or, equivalently half Customer l's consumer surplus per-unit of
inventory.
The maximum profit that a linen supply could earn in this
market by using the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee
pricing system is given in the following equation:
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2
SC x + P* -X- TC
i=l
and, since
T* = p, T ( P)dP = p*1(P)dP
C . X2  C - X1
S= f 1 (P)dP + Af T2 (P)dP + P* X - TC 1
And since the consumer surplus of Customer 1 at a laundering
fee price of P* is equal to that of Customer 2:
=- 1.5 * 1 (P)dP + P X - TC I
Let us now consider the profit that this same linen
supply would earn under a Delivery Charge Plus Laundering
Fee Pricing system. Again it will be reasonable to expect
that the linen supply's total cost will not vary substantially
between the two systems. We shall not allow the Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system to set a right-to-buy
tariff thatwill drive either customer from the market. Also,
we shall set the laundering fee under the Delivery Charge
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Plus Laundering Fee pricing system equal to P*, the optimal
laundering fee under the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering
Fee system, and thereby insure that the quantity of linen
soiled will be the same under both systems. Hence, the linen
supply's total costs as well as the revenues the linen supply
receives from its charge of a laundering fee will be the same
under both systems. The only difference in profit that will
result under the two systems will be due to differences in the
right-to-buy tariffs charged.
If the laundering fee charged by the linen supply is P*,
then the maximum delivery fee that the linen supply can charge,
without driving either customer from the market, is the amount
of the smallest consumer surplus of any customer. However,
since we have assumed that at a laundering fee price of P*,
Customer 1 and Customer 2 have the same amount of consumer
surplus, the maximum delivery fee D* that the linen supply
can charge will be equal to the consumer surpluses of both
customers:
D* = fp!(P)dP = f. *2 (P)dP
The profit the linen supply would earn under a Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee pricing system is given by the
following equation:
v = N .D + P * X - TCD
When, N the number of customers is replaced by 2, the number
of customers in our example; D, the delivery charge is
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replaced by fI' (,CP)dP, the consumer surplus of Customer 1;p L
and P is replaced by P* the given laundering fee price, this
equation becomes the following:
S= 2 (P (P)dP + P* X - TCCXI
Comparing these profits with the profit the. linen supply
would earn under an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee
pricing system, we find that in this special sort of market,
the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee will provide
greater profits than the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee
system. This result, of course, contrasts with the results of
our earlier example in which we found the Inventory Charge
Plus Laundering Fee system to be more profitable than
the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system. Thus, the
question of whether it is more profitable to use a variable
two-part tariff, such as the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering
Fee system, or a uniform two-part tariff such as the Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system, cannot be decided a priori:
whether one system is better than the other depends on the
market in which the linen supply is operating.
The example I used to demonstrate that under certain
circumstances a linen supply would prefer to use a Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system, relied of course on some
rather far-fetched assumptions. We assumed that at
a laundering fee price of. P*
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both customers had identical consumer surpluses, and that at
a laundering fee price of P* one customer would choose to
soil twice the amount soiled by the other. Of course, these
particular assumptions need not hold in order for a Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee pricing system to produce greater
profits than an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system.
In fact, it can be shown that a monopolistic linen supply
will prefer to use a Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee
pricing system so long as the amount of inventory the linen
Supply must hold to service the customer with the smallest
consumer surplus is greater than the average inventory of
linen it holds per customer. That is,in a monopolistic market
of N customers, where K CP) is the ith customer's demand
th
curve, I(Xi) is the amount of inventory held for the i
customer, and where P* is the optimal laundering fee price under
the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system, if Customer K
is the customer such that,
fp• KP)dP i=•io N (P* ~  (P)dP)
and if N
I X I (Xi
K i=l N
then the linen supply wilt earn greater profit under a
Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee pricing system than it would
under an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system.7
We have seen in this section two sufficient conditions
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for determining whether the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering
Fee system is more profitable than the Delivery Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system:
Cl) If Customer J is the customer with the smallest
consumer surplus per unit of inventory and if
the linen supply holds less than the average
amount of inventory for Customer J, then the
Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system is
more profitable,
(21 If Customer K is the customer with the smallest
consumer surplus and if the linen supply holds
more than the average quantity of linen to
service -Customer K, then the Delivery Fee plus
Laundering. Charge system will be more profitable.
.If neither of these sufficient conditions is fulfilled, then
to my knowledge, there is no. way to determine which of these
two pricing systems is preferable without performing the
computations required to calculate the maximum profit achiev-
able under an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system and
the maximum profit achievable under a Delivery Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system and comparing the two.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER IV
This formula is somewhat different from the formula for
the optimal piece-rate price presented in Chapter III. This
difference is due to the fact that in Chapter III, we assumed
for simplicity that the linen supply had constant marginal
costs which were always eaual to zero. However in both cases
the basic idea behind the formula is the same: Charge the
smaller customer the maximu-m amount he would be willing to pay
for the maximum number of units it is profitable to rent to him.
In both cases, the forl ulae give that amount in terms of the
area under the customer's demand curve, between the price axis
and the minimum required quantity of linen.
I have chosen to consider this type of market, rather
than the market in which Customer 2 would prefer to receive
less than the recuired minimum of q- units, because in this
latter case, it is trivially easy t- show that the Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system can exactly duplicate the
profits earned under the Piece-Rate -ith a- Minimum system:
If Customer 2 would prefer to receive less than the reauired
qmin units at a piece-rate of P* in the absence of a minimum,
then when a minimum of q units is enforced, Customer 2
will choose to receive no more than qmin and will thus pav a
total amount ecual to P•*qmin- (We know that Customer 2
would be willing to pay this amount because P*.amin exhausts
the consumer surplus of Customer 1 and the consumer surplus
of Customer 2 is always larcrer than that of Customer 1.)
Thus, the total profit that the linen supply would earn in this
case, would be equal to the profit it earns from serving
Customer 1 plus the profit it earns from serving Customer 2:
Total Profit = (P*-MC) (qin + qmin)
2(P* - MC) . qmin
Or substituting for P* the appropriate value:
Total Profit = 2 co (P)dPI "MC1 !
Consider now the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system
in which:
Delivery Fee = • ' (P)dP
Laundering Fee = MC
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Since marginal costs are constant, the revenues the linen
supply receives from charging a laundering fee equal to marginal
cost will exactly equal the linen supply's cost of providing
each unit of linen rented. All profits will be derived from
charging delivery fees to both customers, and thus, total
profits will be exactly equal to the maximum profits that
could be earned by the Piece-Rate With a Minimum pricing
system:
Total Profit 2-.MC T (P)dP 1
3The Piece-Rate With a Minimum earns greater profit than
the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system on each
customer who would prefer to receive less than the required
minimum at the optimal piece-rate price. The Delivery Charge
Plus Laundering Fee system earns greater profit than the
Piece-Rate With a Minimum system on each customer who prefers
to receive more than the required minimum at the given piece
rate. Thus, so long as the number of customers who prefer to
receive more than the required minimum is greater than the
number of customers who would prefer to receive less than the
required minimum, the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee
system will be better than the Piece Rate With a Minimum.
4A further observation will amplify this point. Typic-
ally, there is much more variety in size among a linen supply's
smaller customers than among its larger customers. That is,
the frequency distribution of the size of a linen supply's
customers is most commonly skewed to the right:
Number
of
Customers
*Mgan Median quantity of
linen
received
Frequencv Distribution of Customers
im i I i im !
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Thus, a linen supply's smallest customers are normally
much smaller than the median customer size. Thus, since one is
most likely to find the customer with the smallest consumer
surplus among the linen supply's smallest customers, it is
extremely unlikely that less than half of the linen supply's
customers will choose to receive more than the required minimum.
To show that, under these circumstances, the Inventory
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system is preferable to the Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system, it is sufficient to show
that the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system can pro-
duce profits greater than the profits ajhieved under an optimal
choice of number of customers served, N , laundering fee P*
and delivery fee D* of a Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee
system.
To show this, we shall reauire the Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee to serve the same group of N* customers and to
charge the same laundering fee price P*. Thus, since neither
system requires a minim~m, we shall expect total costs under
both systems to be the same. Also, since the laundering fee
charged is the same under both systems, the revenues received
from charging the same group of customers the same laundering
fee will be the same. Thus, any difference in profits between
the two systems will occur as a result of the right to buy
tariffs charged.
If Customer K is the customer with the smallest consumer
surplus of any customer remaining in the market, then the
Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee pricing system will charge
a right-to-buy tariff equal to his consumer surplus:
D*= T K (P)dP
Total revenues from charging this delivery fee to all customers
will be the delivery fee times the number of customers.
RD = N*D*
Suppose that of the N* customers in the market Customer
J is the customer with the smallest consumer surplus per-unit
of inventory, and that the inventory the linen supply holds
to service Customer J is less than the average amount of
inventory held per customer:
N*
I(Xj) < . I(X i )
i=l
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where I(X.) is the amount of inventory held on behalf of the
ith customer. Thus, the inventory fee charged by an inventory
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system will be the consumer surplus
of Customer J divided by the inventory held for Customer J:
T* =.1 *K(P)dP
I(XK),
The revenues received will be equal to the inventory fee T*
times the total amount of inventory the linen supply holds to
service all customers:
N*
RI = T* I I(Xi ) ,
i=l
Clearly, since Customer K is the customer with the
smallest consumer surplus, his consumer surplus will be less
or equal to that of Customer J:
fp,7K(P)dp T (P)dP
N*
Multiplying through by j I(X i )/I(X j)
i=l
we obtain:
N* N*
I(Xi) * K(P ) d P  <. I(Xi) CO YL  (P)dP
i= 1 -- = 1
I(Xj) I(Xj)
N*
But since by assumption, I(Xj) < I(X )  ,
i=l
N*
N*- N*"
i= I(X ) f' YK(P)dP Z I(X. ) f j(P)dPi=1 < i=l
N* I(Xj)
I I(x1i )
Simplifying, we obtain:
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N*
N*f "* T(P)dP < I(X) f4 T (P)dP
p K pi=l _
I(Xj)
N*
N* * D* < T* I(X i )
i=l
Thus, the revenues produced by an Inventory Charge Plus Laun-
dering Fee system's charge of a right-to-buy tariff are greater
than or equal to those of a Delivery Charge Plus Laundering
Fee system. Since differences in profits were shown to rely
only on differences in the revenues from right-to-buy tariffs
charged, the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system will
provide profits at least as great as the maximum profits
achievable under a Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system
in this market.
To show that, under these circumstances, the Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system is preferable to the Inven-
tory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system, it is sufficient to
show that the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system can
produce profits greater than the profits achieved under an
optimal choice of nymber of customers N*, laundering fee P*
'and inventory fee T of an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering
Fee system.
To show this, we shall require the Delivery Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system to serve the same group of Nx customers
and to charge the same laundering fee P* as the Inventory
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system. Thus, since neither system
requires a minimum, we shall expect both total costs under
both systems to be the same. Also, since the laundering fee
is the same under both systems, the revenues received from
charging the same group of customers the same laundering fee
will be the same. Thus, any difference in profits between the
two systems will occur as a result of the right to buy tariff
charged.
If Customer J is the customer with the smallest consumer
surplus per-unit of inventory of any customer remaining in the
market, then the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system
will charge a right-to-buy" price equal to Customer J's consumer
surplus divided by the amount of inventpry required to service
Customer J:
T* = TQ (P)dP
I(X )
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Total revenues from charging this inventory fee to all cus-
tomers will be equal to the inventory fee T* times the total
amount of inventory the linen supply holds to service all
customers:
SN*
RI = T* - X I(Xi )
Ii=l
Suppose that of the N* customers in the market, Customer
K is the customer with the smallest consumer surplus, and that
the inventory the linen supply holds to service Customer K is
greater than the average amount of inventory held per-customer:
.N*
I(XK) < [ I(X i )
i=l
N
The optimal delivery fee to charge will be the consumer sur-
plus of Customer K:
D* = f* lK(P)dP
Revenues received from charging all customers this delivery
'charge will be equal to the delivery fee D* times the number
of customers:
RD = N* - D*
Clearly, since Customer J is the customer with the
smallest consumer surplus per-unit of inventory, the consumer
surplus per-unit of inventory for Customer K will be greater
than or equal to that of Customer J:
(p* KW dP p q•(P)dP
I(XK) I(X )
N*
Multiplying through by I I(X i ) we obtain:
i=l
N**SI(Xi ) TK(P)dP f UIj (P)dP I(X
i=l p -- > P* i
I (XK )  I(X J)
N*
But since by assumption, I(X K ) > [ I(Xi )
i=l
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N N*I(X.) (P)dP (P)dP
i=l >K  I
N* I(Xj) iel
SI(X i )
i=l
N*
Simplifying, we obtain:
N*
N* KY ( P ) d P > Y,*( P ) d P  I(X )p K -P 1
I(Xj) i=l
N* • D* > T* X I(Xi)
i=l
Thus, the revenues received from charging a delivery fee
'under the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system are
greater than or equal to the revenues received from charging
-an inventory fee under the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering
Fee system. Since differences in profits were shown to rely
only on differences in the revenues received from right-to-
buy tariffs charged, the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee
system will provide profits at least as large as the maximum
profits achievable in this market under an Inventory Charge
Plus Laundering Fee system.
CHAPTER V
APPLICATIONS
In the last chapter we saw that the two most preferable
pricing systems for a linen supply to use are the Inventory
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system and the Delivery Charge
Plus Laundering Fee system. Which of these two systems is
most preferable depends on the particular markets in which
the linen supply operates. In some markets, a linen supply
will earn greater profits under a Delivery Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system than under an Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system. In other markets an Inventory Charge
Plus Laundering Fee system will produce larger profits than
a Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system.
In Chapter III, we developed rules for the optimal use
of both of these pricing systems. As you recall, however, in
order to make optimal use of either the Delivery Charge Plus
Laundering Fee system or the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering
Fee system, a linen supply manager must know a tremendous
amount about the customers his plant serves. In particular,
the optimal use of both these pricing systems requires that
the plant manager know the demand curve of each of its
potential customers. Linen supply plant managers are, how-
ever, not omniscient. Even the most informed plant manager
would never know the demand curves of each of his potential
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customers, and thus unless a way can be found to simplify the
information requirements of two-part pricing systems, the
theoretical groundwork we have laid thus far will be of little
practical use in the linen supply industry.
Consequently, in this chapter I plan to develop in rough
outline a computer program to help plant managers decide which
pricing system to use and at what level to set prices. Basic-
ally the idea will be to treat the market for a particular
item of linen as being composed of a relatively small number of
customer types. The program will require managers to estimate
the demand curve of each customer type and to estimate what
percent of the total market for that item of linen is best
described by that customer type. The manager will also be
required to estimate his plant's marginal cost of providing
that item of linen. Given this estimate of the marginal cost
function and the simplified description of the market for that
item of linen, the program will calculate the following for
both the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system and the
Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system:
Cl) whether it is worthwhile to deal with all
customer types;
(2) the optimal right-to-buy tariff to charge
(inventory fee or delivery charge);
(3) the optimal per-unit of output price (laundering
fee) tb charge;
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(4) the profit the linen supply would expect to
earn from dealing with the optimal mix of
customer types and charging the optimal right-
to-buy tariffs and laundering fees.
By comparing the expected profit under both systems, the
manager can determine whether an Inventory Charge Plus Launder-
ing Fee system is preferable to a Delivery Charge Plus Launder-
ing Fee system, or vice-versa. Furthermore, by altering the
estimates he inputs to the program, the manager will be able
to determine whether the dominance of one pricing system over
the other is sensitive to the accuracy of his estimates.
The computer program I' envision to accomplish this
task can best be explained in four parts:
(a) Estimating the marginal cost function;
(b) Analysis of the market;
(c) Calculations by the, program;
(d1 Possible extensions of the program.
We shall now consider each of these four parts.
A, Estimating the Linen Supply's Marginal Cost Function
A firm's marginal cost is the increase in the firm's total
costs that would result from producing one more unit of output.
A marginal cost function depicts how total costs will change
as volume changes. A linen supply,,however, provides its
customers with many different types of products, and many of
the costs a linen supply incurs in providing those products
. ..
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are joint costs, that is, costs such as general overhead or
the cost of operating a piece of equipment which process
several products, which cannot be assigned with certainty
to any particular product.
Typically, cost accountants will allocate joint costs
to a particular product on the basis of what percent that
product constituted of the total products which together were
responsible for incurring the joint cost. That is, cost
accountants will generally allocate joint costs in three
steps:
First, the total amount of joint costs are determined.
Second, the percent of all joint-cost products which
a particular type of product constituted is determined.
This is simply done by dividing the number of products
of the particular type by the total number of products
which were together responsible: for incurring the
joint costs..
Third, the joint costs allocated to products of a
particular type is calculated by multiplying the
total amount of joint costs by the percent of all
joint-cost products t-hat the particular type of
product constituted-.
Thus, for example, if 5% ,of the total pounds of linen washed
were Turkish towels, 'a linen supply's cost accountant might
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assign 5% of the total cost of washing all products to Turkish
towels.
This procedure seems reasonable enough for allocating
a linen supply's joint costs to the products it provides and
hence, I shall propose a method for estimating the marginal
cost of a particular item of linen which incorporates this
procedure. More exactly, the method' I propose will require
the computer program to make an assumption about how the mix
of products provided by a linen supply will change as total
plant volume changes. The program will then ask the plant
manager to estimate how his plant's total costs will change as
total plant volume changes. Finally, the program will use the
cost accountants' procedure to allocate the change in total
cost to the changes in volume of particular products, and from
this derive the marginal cost functions for particular products.
To see how this method for estimating the marginal cost
functions of particular products will work, we shall consider
an example. Let us suppose that a linen supply currently
provides N Turkish towels per month. If the linen supply
knew how its mix of products would change as the total volume
of linen rented changes, then the linen supply could determine
what level of total volume it would have to reach in order for
one additional Turkish towel to be rented. Let us denote the
linen supply's current total volume as Vo and the total
volume it would have to. reach in order to rent an additional
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Turkish towel V . If the linen supply also knew how its
total costs would change as total volume changes, then it
would be able to determine the total costs it would incur if
its volume were to increase to V1 . We shall call the linen
supply's current total costs TC0 and denote by TC1 the linen
supply's total costs at a volume of V1. Following the proced-
ure for allocating joint costs, we find that the linen supply's
current cost of providing N Turkish towels is the following:
Current Cost
of N Turkish = o
Towels o
Again, following the procedure for allocating joint costs, we
find that the cost of providing N+l Turkish towels would be:
Cost of N+1
Turkish N+I . TC1
Towels 1
Subtracting the linen supply's cost of providing N Turkish
towels from the cost of providing N+l Turkish towels we get
the increase in total cost associated with renting one addi-
tional Turkish towel, or equivalently the marginal cost of
Turkish towels:
Marginal Cost N TC - N+l TC
of Turkish -- o
Towels o 1
This method for estimating the marginal cost of a
particular item Qf linen requires that we know both how the
mix of products provided by a linen supply will change as
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total volume changes, and how total costs will change as total
plant volume changes. We may, I believe, rely on plant
managers to provide this latter sort of information. That is,
the computer program could ask managers to estimate how total
costs would change as total plant volume changes, by asking the
plant manager such questions as the following:
If the total poundage washed pressed and
delivered by your plant were to increase 10%
by what percent would total costs increase?
Once the plant manager has answered such questions for a number
of different percentage changes in plant volume, the program
would be able to estimate the general trend of how total costs
will change as volume changes and use that general trend to
estimate, for any particular level of volume, what total -costs
are likely to be.
The second type of information my method for estimating
marginal costs will require is more elusive. There is,
after all, no causal relation running from changes in plant
volume to changes in product mix, as there is running from
changes in total cost. Rather, an increase in plant volume
could result in any of an infinite number of different product
mixes,
In this situation, the best that can be done is to make
some fairly plausible assumption about how a linen supply's
product mix.:will change as total plant volume changes. Two
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alternatives seem reasonable:
First, we might assume that a linen supply will always
provide the optimal, that is,' the most profitable, mix of
products possible for a given market of customers. To incor-
porate this assumption into the computer program would require
that the program be designed to solve for the optimal mix of
products for the linen supply to rent at all levels of total
volume at which the plant might operate. Basically, such a
program would collect data on the current capacity of each
department in the plant and the costs of changing the capacity
of each department. For each level of total volume at which
the plant might operate, the program would then allocate each
unit of capacity in each department to that product whose
marginal revenue is the greatest. The resulting mix of products
will be the optimal mix of products the linen supply could
provide.
This version of our computer program has two disadvan-
tages. First, the complexity of designing such a program is
overwhelming. It would take years longer and thousands of
dollars more to build than any linen supply company would be
willing to devote to building it. Second, under a program of
this type, the prices of all products would be set simultan-
eously. Thus, a manager could not effectively use the program
to reconsider his pricing of a particular item of linen. Also,
the manager would not be effectively able to test the sensi-
tivity of this program's results to the descriptions of the
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he provides.
Second, we
supply currently
volume changes.
total volume of
the quantity of
would the quanti
might assume that the product mix a linen
provides will remain constant as total
That is, according to this assumption, if
the linen supply were to increase 10%, th•
Turkish towels would also increase 10% as
ty of tablecloths, uniforms and so on.
There are two factors which recommend the second assump-
tion. First, a computer program making this assumption will
be relatively easy and inexpensive to build. Second, although
the mix of products may vary widely among different linen
supplies, the mix of products provided by a single linen
supply will normally change rather slowly over time. Since
the mix of products for a given linen supply does not seem to
be very volatile, it is reasonable to expect that, at differ-
ent levels of total volume the resulting mix of products will
not be far different from the current mix of products.
When this assumption is incorporated into the computer
program, we may summarize the procedures the program will
follow to estimate the marginal cost of a particular item of
linen by way of the following four steps.
First, the program will ask the plant manager to specify
his current total volume and current total costs, and to
estimate how total costs will change as total volume changes.
Sdcond, the program will ask the plant manager to specify
the
en
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his current product mix. That is, the manager will be asked
what percent of his plant's current total volume is accounted
for by the product he is attempting to price.
Third, the program will solve for that level of total
plant volume which would result in one additional unit of the
relevant type of linen being rented. The program will then
estimate the total costs the linen supply would incur at that
level of total volume.
Finally, the program will calculate what part of total
costs should be assigned to the product for both the current
level of total volume, and that volume at which one additional
unit is rented. The difference between these two shares of
total costs is the marginal cost of the product he is attempt-
-ing to price.
B. Analysis of the Market
One fundamental difficulty that a linen supply manager
would have in using the theoretical analyses of two-part
pricing systems presented in Chapter III, is that the optimal
use of these pricing systems require that the manager know the
cdemand cdurves of each of his potential customers. In this
section I shall present a method for simplifying the informa-
tional requirements of these systems. Basically, the idea
will be to treat the market for a particular item of linen
as being composed of a relatively small number of customer
types. The program will require plant managers to estimate
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the size of the total market, the demand curve of each customer
type, and the percent of the total market for that item of
linen best described by each customer type.
All simplifications pay a price in the accuracy of the
information they convey. To avoid any confusion, I would like
now to state explicitly what price my system of customer types
pays in terms of the accuracy of the results the program will
generate: My analysis of the market into customer types
assumes that all customers have constant elasticity demand
curves of the form,
x = aPb
where x is the quantity of the relevant type of linen received
per month, a is some parameter varying from customer to cus-
tomer, P is the laundering fee charged and b is the customer's
price elasticity. We have seen this form of demand curve
before, in Chapter III, where I presented a few reasons why it
is reasonable to believe that demand curves may take this
shape. Yet, although it is reasonable to believe that
customers do have this sort of constant elasticity demand
curves, in fact their demand curves may be somewhat different.
Thus, the descriptions of the market provided by my system
cannot be expected to be entirely accurate.
If we do make these assumptions, then it will be possible
for plant managers to define the demand curves the program will
require in terms of two fairly simple concepts: customer size
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and price sensitivity.1 Customer size is determined by the
quantity of the relevant item of linen a customer receives
per month at the current laundering fee per unit. Price
sensitivity is simply the customer's price elasticity or the
percentage change in quantity which would result from a one
percent change in the laundering fee.
The procedure the program will follow to obtain a
description of the market in terms of customer types may be
divided into four steps.
First, the program will require the plant manager to
estimate the size of the total market. To do this, the man-
ager specifies the current laundering fee charged and the
total quantity of linen which is rented per month at that
laundering fee, Also, the plant manager will be asked to
estimate the total number of customers in the market. Finally,
in order that the program will be able to calculate the revenue
received under an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system,
the manager will be asked to specify the inventory multiple
to use in calculating the inventory the linen supply must
hold to service a customer receiving a given amount of linen
per month.
Second, the program will ask the plant manager to define
three sizes of customers. To do this, the manager simply
specifies the quantity of the relevant type of linen typic-
ally received by small miedium and large customers. Ideally,
17 9
the quantity of linen that the linen supply manager specifies
for the typical small customer will be the median quantity
of linen received by all customers the manager considers small,
and similarly for medium and large customers.
Third, the program will require the plant manager to
define three degrees of price sensitivity Among
customers. That is, the manager will specify the median price
elasticity for customers he considers very price sensitive,
moderately price sensitive, and not-so price sensitive.
By following steps two and three, the plant manager will,
in effect, have divided the total market for the item of linen
he is attempting to price into the nine customer types given
in the following table.
Types of Customers
Moderately Not Very Price
/Very Price Price- Sensitive
Size of Sensitive Sensitive E = e3Customer E = e E = e2
Small
S1
Medium
S2
Large
S3
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In the final step, the plant manager will be asked to
decide what percent of the total market is best described by
each customer type. Thus, the manager will be required to
fill in the above table by asking himself, "What percent of
my total potential customers are small and very price sensi-
tive?" "What percent are small and moderately price sensi-
tive?" and so on.
Thus, at this stage of the program, the plant manager
will have completed the analysis of the market for a particu-
lar item of linen into nine customer types. The computer
program will then be able to use this description of the
market. to generate the demand curve of-each of the nine
customer types, and to weight each of those demand curves
by the estimated number of customers of that type. We might
represent what the computer "knows" from performing these
calculations by way of the following equation:
b b b
X = m.a.P + m2q2P +...+ m a P aii qq
Where:
X = Total quantity of linen soiled
.4, = Estimated number of customers of the ith
customer type.
= Estimated total. number of customers, times
estimated* percent of the market represented by
t thr typthe i custo.er type
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a.Pi = Demand curve of the ith customer type
Calculations by the Proaram
Up to this point, the computer program has merely accepted
input from the plant manager and performed calculations to
derive approximations of various demand curves. The program
must now use this data to decide which of the two most pre-
ferred pricing systems to use, and at what level to set prices.
More specifically, the program must now calculate for both the
Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system and the Delivery
Charge Plus Laundering Fee system the following:
(1) whether it is worthwhile to deal with all
customer types;
(2) the optimal right-to-buy tariff to charge
(inventory fee or delivery charge);
(3) the optimal per-unit of output price (laundering
fee) to charge;
(4) the profit the linen supply would expect to earn
from dealing with optimal mix of customer types
and charging the optimal right-to-buy tariffs
and laundering fees.
The plant manager will then compare the expected profits
earned under both systems and select the most profitable.
To make the program perform these calculations, we need
only construct the program so that it will follow the rule for
maximizing profit under the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering
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Fee system and the rule for maximizing profit under the
Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee system. For each mixture
of customer types which the linen supply might choose to
serve, these rules generate the optimal right-to-buy tariffs
and laundering fees. Also, by calculating the estimated
profit for each mix of customer types, these rules will
allow the program to determine the optimal mix of customer
types to serve under each pricing system and the level of
profits the linen supply can expect to earn from doing so.
Specifically, the calculations the program will perform
are the following.
Calculation of Profits under a Delivery Charge Plus
Laundering Fee Pricing System
Following the rules for maximizing profit u nder a uni-
form two-part tariff, the program will first assume that all
customers are to remain in the market. It will then calculate
the optimal laundering fee, delivery charge and the profit the
linen supply could expect to earn from serving all customers.
Next, the program will assume that the type of customer with
the smallest consumer surplus, the smallest, most price
sensitive type of customer will be excluded from the market.
The program will then recalculate the optimal laundering fee
and delivery charge and compute the profit the linen supply
could expect to 6arn from'serving all but the smallest, most
price sensitive customers.
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The program will continue to exclude customer types and
calculate the linen supply's expected profits until the
expected profits begin to decline. The program will then
determine for what mix of customer types the linen supply's
expected profits are the greatest. Finally, the program will
report to the plant manager using the program the optimal
customer mix, laundering fee, delivery charge and the profit
the linen supply could expect to earn by serving that optimal
mix of customers. These calculations will involve three sub-
routines.
First, the optimal laundering fee P* will be calculated
from the formula:
MC
L-NS k
1+ E
where;
N = Number of customers remaining in the market
s k= Market share demanded by customers of the
customer type with the smallest consumer surplus
of any customer type remaining in the market
E = Elasticity of the market demand curve, taking
account of the fact that some types of customers
may have been driven from the market.2
MC= Marginal cost.
Second, the optimal delivery charge D* is calculated from
the formula
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b bk+1
D* = fPaka
bk+lbk
where a P is the demand curve of the customer type with the
x
smallest consumer surplus of any customer type in the market
at a laundering fee price of P*, and where bk is less than
negative one.
Finally, the profit the linen supply can expect to earn
by serving the customers remaining in the market is calculated.
To perform this calculation, the program substitutes the values
for P and D into the profit equation of the linen supply. The
general form of the profit equation for a linen supply using
a Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee Pricing system is the
following:
S= D N + P * X - TC
where:
N = Number of customers remaining in the market
X = Total quantity of linen soiled by customers
remaining in the market
TC = Total cost.
Calculation of Profits Under an Inventory Charge Plus
Laundering Fee Pricing System
Following the rules for maximizing p'rofit under an
Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system, the program will
again at first assume that all customers are to remain in the
market. It will then calculate the optimal laundering fee and
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inventory fee and compute the profit the linen supply could
exect to earn from serving all customers. Next, the program
will assume that the type of customer with the smallest con-
suller surplus per-unit of inventory will be excluded from
tho market. The program will then recalculate the optimal
laitudering fee and inventory fee, and compute the -profit the
linen supply could expect to earn from serving all customers
but that type with the smallest consumer surplus per unit of
inventory.
The program will continue to exclude customer types and
calculate the linen supply's expected profits until the expected
profits begin to decrease. The program will then determine
for what mix of customer types the linen supply's expected
profits are greatest. Finally, the program will report to the
plant manager using the program the optimal customer mix,
inventory fee, laundering fee and the profit the linen supply
could expect to earn by serving that optimal mix of customers.
These calculations will again involve three subroutines.
First, the optimal laundering fee P* will be calculated
from the formula:
MC * E
1 + E + E+1
b +1
Wheare:
b. = Price elasticity of the customer type with
the smallest consumer surplus per unit of
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inventory of any customer type remaining in
the market (bJ < -1)
E = Elasticity of market demand curve, taking
account of the fact that some types of customers
may have been driven from the market.
MC = Marginal cost
The second subroutine calculates the optimal inventory
fee T* to charge per unit of inventory from the following
formula b.
I a.P dP P,T* = p* a PI
C(a P*bj) (b +1)C
where C is the inventory multiple and b is the price elasti-
city of the customer type with the smallest consumer surplus
per unit of inventory of any customer type remaining in the
market.
Finally, the last subroutine calculates the profit the
linen supply can expect to earn by serving all customers
remaining in the market. To perform this calculation, the
program substitutes the optimal values for the laundering
fee P and inventory fee T into the profit equation of the
linen supply. For the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee
this equation is the following:
S= T - C X + P * X - TC
where
C = Inventory multiple
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X = Total quantity of linen soiled by customers
remaining in the market at a laundering fee price
of P
TC = Total Cost
D. Possible Extensions of the Program
I would like now to discuss two ways in which the computer
program might be changed to provide more subtle determinations
of optimal customer mix, optimal prices and project profits.
The first change that might be made in the program is to
require the plant manager to provide a more detailed descrip-
tion of the potential market for the item of linen he is
attempting to price. One way in which a more detailed
description of the market might be obtained would be to ask
the plant manager to define twelve, sixteen or twenty customer
types instead of only nine. For example, the plant manager
might be asked to define the twenty customer types, and give
estimates of the population of each type in the following
table:
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Price Sensitivity
Extremely Very Moderately Not Very
ize of Price Price Price Price
Customer Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive
Very Large
Large
Medium
Small
Very
Small
Another way in which the description of the market
might be made more detailed is for the program to ask the
manager for a more detailed description of certain customer
types. For example, a first run through the program might
tell the manager not to deal with large, very price sensitive
customers under an Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee
system. However, since not all large very price sensitive
customers are equally large or equally price sensitive, in
reality it may be worthwhile for the linen supply to provide
service to a few of those customers. Thus, the program could
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be constructed so as to ask the manager to describe the large,
very price sensitive customer type in more detail. This the
manager would do by means of the same mechanism he used to
describe the market as a whole: He would divide the lar-
very price sensitive customer type into sub-types, specify
the customer size and price sensitivity of each sub-type and
estimate the population of each sub-type. The program would
then substitute these customer sub-types for the large, very
price-sensitive customer type and recalculate an optimal
customer mix, inventory fee, laundering fee and expected level
of profit.
We might represent this procedure by way of the follow-
ing two tables. If the program is designed to recognize only
nine customer types, then on the first run through the program,
the manager will be asked to define the customer types and
estimate the population of each type in the following table.
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All Potential Customers
Price Sensitivity
Very Moderately Not Very
Size of Price Price- Price-
Customer Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive
Small
Medium
Large
Upon finding that the program recommends that he not deal with
large, price sensitive customers, the manager then describes
the population of large, very price sensitive customers in
terms of nine sub-types of customers.
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Large, Very Price Sensitive Customers
Price Sensitivity
(Relatively) (Relatively)
(Relatively) Moderately Not Very
Size of Very Price Price Price
Customer Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive
(Relatively)
Small
(Relatively)
Medium
(Relatively)
Large
The program will then substitute this more detailed
description for the description of the large, price sensitive
customer type it used on its first run through the program.
After this substitution is made, the program will in effect
recognize seventeen customer types: nine sub-types of cus-
tomers and the eight customer types remaining from the first
run through the program. The program will then solve for the
optimal mix of.these seventeen customer types, the optimal
inventory and laundering'fees and the linen supply's expected
profits.
The difficultywith implementing these two procedures
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for improving the market descriptions provided by plant
managers is that they may well ask the manager for informa-
tion he cannot provide. Managers, in my experience, can
distinguish nine types of customers. Beyond nine customer
types, however, managers' eyes tend to glaze and their
responses when forthcoming, are not uttered with much convic-
tion. Thus, except for those few managers who know the
markets for their products very well, these options for
more detailed market descriptions might well go unused or,
worse yet, be misused.
A second possible extension of the computer program
would be to build the program so that it will recognize
customer types having demand curves of a different from
than x = aP b, the constant elasticity demand curve I have
required the program to use. For example, in addition to the
constant elasticity demand curve,.x = a-Pb the program might
also recognize demand curves which are linear: x. = mP + c.
If this were the case, then the manager would be asked to
estimate for each size and price sensitivity of customer type,
what percent of that customer type has straight line demand
curves and what percent has constant elasticity demand curves.
The program would then calculate for each customer type the
appropriate straight line demand curve and constant elasticity
demand curve, assign the manager's'population estimates to
e3
each type of demand curve for each customer type3 The
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program would then continue with its calculations to determine
the optimal customer mix, optimal right-to-buy tariffs and
laundering fees, and project the linen supply's profit under
both pricing systems.
In effect, the informati6n the plant manager would be
asked to provide is represented by the following table.
Tvoes of Customers
.Moderately Not Very
Size of Very Price Price Price
Customer Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive
,l% 
% %
Sstraight straight straight
line % line % line %
constant constant constant
elasticity elasticity / elasticity
% % %
Medium straight straight straight
line line line
constant constant constant
elasticity elasticity elasticity
Large straight straight straight
lin li line line
constant constant constant
elaelasticity elasticity elasticity
However theoretically more preferable this way of de-
scr.ibing the market, it seems to me to be rather impractical.
Many plant managers would find it difficult to understand
the difference in customer behavior implied by a straight
I
I
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line rather than a constant elasticity demand curve. Nearly
all plant managers would find it difficult to say with any
degree of confidence what percent of customers of a given
customer type are likely to have straight line rather than
constant elasticity demand curves. Thus again, except for
those few managers who know the markets for their -products
very well, this option for a more detailed market descrip-
tion might well go unused or be misused.
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FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER FIVE
iIf we assume that a customer has a demand curve of the
form X = aPb and we are given estimates of his price elasticity
of demand, b, and the quantity of linen Xl he receives at the
current laundering fee Pl, we may calculate the parameter a as
follows:
Xi = aPl b
a = Xl
P 1b
Thus, the customer's demand curve is given by:
q = Xl b
P D
I 2 f customers are driven from market, then the resulting
market demand curve need not retain the same elasticity as the
-market demand curve when all customers are allowed to remain in
the market. If for example, all customers of the smallest most
price sensitive type were driven from the market, the resulting
demand curve would be:
bi bi
X = m.a.P - mla P
i=l
The price elasticity of this demand curve would be calculated
as follows:
Elasticity Percentage change in quantity demanded
Percentage change in price
AX AP
X P
AX - P
AP X
Or, when the change in price is very small:
dX PElasticity - dP X
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9 bi-l b1 -1 p
Sm.b ia.P - m*bl -a P -
i=l X
i mibiaPbi - mlbl'a P bl
9 bi bl
Smiai P - mla P
This quantity is the price elasticity of the market demand
curve when the smallest most price sensitive customers are
driven from the market. Obviously, this quantity need not be
the same as the price elasticity of the market demand curve
when all customers are allowed to remain in the market.
In general, if s customer types are excluded from the
market, the resulting market demand curves will be:
9 bi s bj
X =- m.a.b.P - 1 mja.b.P
i=l j=1
This market demand curve will have an elasticity equal to
9 s - -
. m.a.b.Pi - I m.a.b.Pbj
i=1 1 1 1 j=l 3 J 3
9 bi s b
Smia..P - Z' m.a.P
i=l j=l 3 3
3
How an estimate of the appropriate straight line
demand curve could be made given only the size of customer
and the level of price sensitivity which define a customer
type may require some explanation.
Customer size, as you recall, is the quantity of linen
soiled by a customer type at the current piece-rate or laun-
dering fee. Thus, given a customer size, we have one point
on the demand curve of that customer type.
The index of price sensitivity is the estimated price
elasticity of the customer type. That is, the price sensi-
tivity of the customer type is the percentage change in quan-
tity of linen reccived per month which would result from a
1% change in the laundering fee. For a straight line demand
curve the price elasticity will change as the quantity of
linen received changes. Nonetheless, at any given quantity
of linen received the price elasticity is fixed. Thus, if
the manager were to estimate the price elasticity at current
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prices, the program could calculate the quantity of linen
that a customer with a straight line demand curve would
receive if prices were increased 1%. (That calculation
would simply be to multiply the customer's current quantity
received by his price elasticity at the current level of
prices of quantity received.) The programn would then have
two points on the demand curve of the customer type. Of
course, since two points on a straight line define that line,
the program would be able to define the straight line demand
curve of that customer type.
. I
CHAPTER VI
SUMNMARY
A. One Part Pricing Systems
There are two types of one part pricing systems: dis-
criminating systems and non-discriminating systems. Under
a discriminating one part pricing system, each customer is
charged the maximum amount he is willing to pay for each
unit of output he purchases. Thus, each customer will end
up paying a different price for each unit of output he pur-
chases. A discriminating one part pricing system will
provide a given firm with the maximum profit it can earn
by operating in a given market. Yet, because discriminat-
ing one part pricing systems are not legal, no linen supply
will wish to use one.
Under a non-discriminating one-part pricing system,
all customers are charged the same price for all units of
output they purchase. The Piece Rate pricing system is a
sort of non-discriminating one-part pricing system, since
all customers are charged the same piece rate for all
pieces of linen they choose to receive. Non-discriminating
one part pricing systems, such as the Piece Rate system,
are in general, not the most profitable type of system.
As long as a linen supply has some degree of monopoly power,
it will earn larger profits under a two part pricing system
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than it would under the piece rate system. However, in a
purely competitive market, the piece rate system will pro-
vide profits as large as those earned under any two part
pricing system.
B. Two Part Pricing Systems
A two part pricing system charges customers a per-unit
price for each unit of output they purchase and a price for
the right-to-buy output at that per-unit price. -We may
distinguish two types of two part pricing systems, according
to the form in which the right-to-buy tariff is charged.
A uniform two part pricing system charges all customers
the same right-to-buy tariff. Examples of uniform two part
pricing systems that could be used by linen supplies are the
Piece-Rate With a Minimum system and the Delivery Charge
Plus Laundering Fee system. In all but the most unusual
circumstances, the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee
system will provide larger profits than the Piece-Rate
With a Minimum system. Also, for monopolistic markets
which include a sizeable segment of large, very price sensi-
tive customers, the Delivery Charge Plus Laundering Fee
system is the most profitable, legal pricing system a linen-
supply can use.
The second type of two part pricing system charges
larger customers larger right-to-buy tariffs. Pricing
systems of this type are called variable two part pricing
systems. Two examples of variable two part pricing systems
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which are used by linen supplies are the Flat Rate System
and the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system. In
all cases, the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering Fee system,
will provide profits at least as large as those earned under
a Flat Rate system. Furthermore, for monopolistic markets
in which large customers are not any more price sensitive
than smaller customers, the Inventory Charge Plus Laundering
Fee system is the most profitable, legal pricing system a
linen supply can use.
C. Applications
Deciding which type of pricing system is best is only
part of the problem facing a linen supply. The linen supply
must also determine at what level to set prices under the
optimal type of pricing system.
A computer program can be designed to help plant
managers estimate the optimal level at which to set prices.
Such a program would ask plant managers to define several
types of customers and then to describe the market for an
item of linen in terms of those customer types. From this
data, and the rules for the optimal use of the various pric-
ing systems, the program will calculate whether the linen
supply should serve all customer types, the optimal level
at which to set prices under each pricing system, and the
profit the linen supply could expect to earn under each
system.
